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At the beginning of 2008, South Africa faced its most severe electricity supply crisis to date. The crisis 
led to a severe contraction of mining industry output and had a knock on effect on the rest of the 
economy. This dissertation aimed to explore  how such a crisis could occur in a South Africa, when in 
the years leading up to the crisis, the state owned electricity utility, Eskom,  had won awards  as one 
of the lowest cost, most efficient and technologically innovative electricity companies internationally. 
In order to explore this, the method of the analytic narrative was used, this was supported by 
process tracing that identified the key period of research as the years 1998- 2004.  The paper 
explored themes of administrative complexity, competing stakeholders and multiple objectives. It 
was found that the crisis could be credibly explained as  having stemmed from the interaction of 
complex power relations across the public service in a climate of unresolved political conflict and 





















"When Eskom said to the government: 'We think we must invest more in terms of electricity 
generation'... we said not now, later. We were wrong. Eskom was right. We were wrong." 
President of South Africa, 1999-2008 
Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka  
"Maybe we were pessimists who did not believe in our economic growth."  
Minister of Minerals and Energy 1999-2005 
Alec Erwin 
"The decision to charge Eskom with the responsibility to embark on a large and urgent build 
programme in 2004 was in hindsight, late. The president has accepted that this government     
got its timing wrong." 
Minister of the Department of Public Enterprises 2004-2008 
(News24, 2008:1) 
White Paper on the Energy Policy of the Republic of South Africa (1998) 
“Eskom’s present generation capacity will be fully utilised by about 2007. Timely steps will have 
to be taken to ensure that  demand does not exceed available supply capacity.” 
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In January 2008, South Africa was plunged into its most serious energy crisis to date. By the third 
week of the month, South Africa’s energy generating capacity was operating at less than 80% and by 
the fourth week it had been reduced to 75%, leading to a stream of rolling blackouts (Centre for 
Development and Enterprise, 2008:1). After a shutdown of the mining industry on the evening of the 
24 January and an announcement by Eskom to its largest customers that it could no longer guarantee 
the provision of electricity, a national electricity crisis was declared on the 25 January 2008 (Joffe, 
2009,9). The crisis had extreme economic effects; a 22.1% decrease in mining sector output for the 
first quarter of 2008. The Gross Domestic Product fell to a 6 year low and business confidence was at 
its lowest point in 24 years (Centre for Development and Enterprise, 2008:2).   
Many South Africans felt a strong sense of outrage, a feeling that transcended class and colour 
lines.“The damage done by the rolling blackouts was more than just economic fallout, traffic gridlock 
and home-life chaos. There was also damage to our sense of normality . To South  Africans electricity 
is a right not a privilege,” (Makhanya, 2008:26). Outrage at the crisis manifested itself in attacks 
against Eskom employees and national advertisement campaigns mocking Eskom for what was 
perceived as managerial ineptitude (Davids, 2008a: 4 ; Davids, 2008b: 4).  
The first outward signs of an impending crisis came in 2005 with power failures in the Western Cape 
after  complications at the Koeberg nuclear power station (Sunday Times, 2006 a:6). These blackouts 
came as a shock to most South Africans living outside of townships because up until that point many 
South Africans had grown accustomed to cheap, reliable and readily available power (McDonald, 
2011:65). Prior to 2005, Eskom was the only state owned enterprise within a developing country to 
be ranked as one of the top power companies globally. South Africa had not experienced power 
shortages and blackouts on the scale of those experienced in developed economies such as the USA 
and Italy (Khoza & Adam, 2005:4). As recently as 2001, Eskom had won the Financial Times Global 
Energy Award for Power Company of the Year for its , “success in providing the world’s lowest cost 
energy while at the same time making superior technological innovations, increasing transmission 
system reliability and developing economical, efficient and safe methods for the combustion of low-
grade coal,” (Khoza & Adam, 2005:3,4). It was one of the post-apartheid government’s top 
performing SOEs. 
Though public awareness of an impending crisis only came to head in 2005, the 1998 White Paper on 
Energy very clearly put forth the possibility of a crisis stating, “Eskom’s present generation capacity 
will be fully utilised by about 2007. Timely steps will have to be taken to ensure that demand does 
not exceed available supply capacity,” (DME, 1998:53). Thus begins the puzzle that this thesis would 
like to explore. How was it that a country with one of the top power companies internationally when 
provided with 10 years of forewarning could allow generation capacity to deteriorate to a crisis-




1.2 Methodology  
 
“We seek to account for outcomes by identifying and exploring the mechanisms that 
generate them….By reading documents, laboring through archives, interviewing, and 
surveying the secondary literature, we seek to understand the actors’ preferences, their 
perceptions, their evaluation of alternatives, the information they possess, the 
expectations they form, the strategies they adopt, and the constraints that limit their 
actions. We seek to cut deeply into the specifics of a time and place, and to locate and 
trace the processes that generate the outcome of interest.” (Bates, Grief ,Levi, Rosenthal 
& Weingast,1998).  
In spite of President Thabo Mbeki’s apology which highlighted lack of government foresight as a key 
cause of the crisis, most of the public discourse blamed Eskom, providing a putative explanation for 
the crisis as managerial incompetence (Mann, 2008: 11). As such, the initial debate and hypothesis 
development on the issue was based on that premise. One of the first hypotheses, H1, posited the 
following: 
 H1: The lack of investment in new generation capacity and the subsequent energy crisis were the 
direct result of poor governance structures within Eskom. 
In the early stages of research it was, however, found that in 2001, a cabinet decision was taken to 
disallow Eskom from participating in any new capacity building projects as a means try and attract 
private sector participation in new generation projects (Public Affairs Research Institute (PARI), 
2013:15). This decision was reversed in 2004 with an announcement by the then Minister of Public 
Enterprises, Alec Erwin, who stated cabinet’s decision to re-instate Eskom as the main developer of 
generation capacity (Newberry & Eberhard, 2008:58). The long lead times in electricity plant 
development meant that though responsibility for new capacity development had returned to 
Eskom, there was insufficient time for them to build the necessary capacity by 2007/8.  Whilst this did 
not completely absolve Eskom of its role in creating a climate for crisis, it did mean that the initial 
hypothesis did not hold and alternative hypotheses would have to be developed in order to provide a 
credible explanation for how the crisis developed.  
A second hypothesis, H2, was developed along with H1 and it stated the following:  
H2: The lack of investment in new generation capacity and the subsequent energy crisis were the 
direct result of having competing stakeholders with multiple objectives and no clear political 
champion of the highly complex  agenda set out in the  1998 White Paper on Energy. 
In order to explore this, the research the method of analytic narrative was selected. The analytic 
narrative is an iterative process whereby one goes through the following process of: Establishing a 
Problem, Generating Theory, Disciplining the Narrative and Modifying Theory. 
Establishing a Problem of Interest: gaining basic information about a particular problem of research 
interest, identifying major events and key stakeholders with a strong impact on the development of 
the problem. 
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Generating Theory:  using the basic information, an initial theory is developed to explain the 
problem, along with an incomplete time line that can be used to contextualise the issue. 
Disciplining the Narrative: the time line is then used as the basis for the beginnings of in-depth 
investigation into the problem, looking for key actions by the various stakeholders with the 
preliminary theory used as a means to discipline the development of an argument.  
Modifying Theory: the analytic narrative process differs from other iterative processes in that new 
information, that does not fit expected outcomes, is used to help redefine the narrative and  
reformulate the model to fit the given data (Bates et.al, 1998). 
 A key issue that was highlighted in the process was the role of Independent Power Producers (IPPs) 
in the development of generation capacity. This was very closely linked to the more technical aspects 
of the Electricity Supply Industry (ESI) and the role of pricing in the attraction of IPP investment. The 
exact nature of this role was as yet unclear.  
Through the process of iteration and re-iteration, the importance of a lack of fit between policy goals 
and regulatory processes in pricing became more defined and the following additional hypothesis, H3 
was developed: 
H3: The lack of investment in new generation capacity and the subsequent energy crisis were the 
direct result of the implementation of policies that lacked internal consistency and whose 
implementation required technical & administrative capabilities beyond those which were available 
in practice.  
Together these hypotheses provided two equifinal explanations for the crisis and needed more in 
depth exploration. Where equifinality refers to the process where different modes of operation can 
provide the same end result. It was decided that process tracing would provide the most 
supplementary support to the use of analytic narrative. Process tracing, “Attempts to identify the 
intervening causal process, the causal chain and causal mechanism between an independent variable 
(or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable,” (George & Bennet, 2005:206). It is a 
method used to explore theories where there is equifinality and the same occurrence could 
potentially be explained by a number of different causal interactions,” (George & Bennet, 
2005:206,207).   
Process tracing was used to develop in-depth historical narratives that explored the causal linkages 
between events leading to the crisis. These accounts were assembled using newspaper articles and 
academic journals to try and recreate an accurate description of how events unfolded.  The research 
focused on the actions of key stakeholders from period of the influential White Paper in 1998, up 
until 2004 when the policy was reversed.  
A major limitation of this methodology was the absence of in person interviews. The lack of personal 
contact meant that whilst it was possible to identify certain key stakeholders through their title as 
Minister or organizational head, it was more difficult to assign personal attribution for less public key 
acts and to fully explore the way in which individual personalities shaped the development of events. 
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1.3 Key Stakeholders 
Initial investigations brought forth a number of key actors with varying levels of involvement in the 
process of crisis development. These actors all held different roles within the South African ESI and 
the socio-political climate. This section of the chapter aims to provide an introductory overview to 
each of the actors, the process tracing methodology followed by these actors and how their actions 
contributed to crisis development.  
The Department of Minerals and Energy (DME) 
The Department of Minerals and Energy (DME) was1 the arm of government with a legal mandate to 
oversee the governance of the minerals and energy industries (DME, 2005:2). Manpower within the 
department was not equally divided between the two industries and the department was often 
described as playing into the minerals energy complex. The department underwent a number of 
structural changes and its policy making capacity with respect to energy was widely dispersed across 
branches of the DME ( EGI-SA,2010:16). With respect to energy, the department’s main function was 
to provide the policy and legislative framework to ensure a functional industry .  
After the 1998 White Paper the department was faced with the complex task of ensuring the 
transformation of the South African ESI, particularly in the areas of Electrification, Distribution and  
Generation (DME, 1998:29). The paper prioritised electrification and distribution over generation. 
The Department of Public Enterprises(DPE) 
The DPE is the arm of government responsible for the successful operation of the country’s State 
Owned Enterprises. As a government organisation, Eskom falls under the legislative mandate of the 
DPE. Whilst energy policy is created within the DME, the DPE acts as the main shareholder 
representative for government in Eskom, taking a keen interest in electricity planning (DPE, 2014; 
EGI-SA, 2010:15).  
Over the period 2001-2004, the DPE acted as the main driver for privatisation efforts within Eskom. 
The department pushed through the Eskom Amendment Act as well as the Eskom Conversion Act 
that transformed Eskom into a tax paying company (PARI, 2013:8,9).  
National Electricity Regulator (NER) 
Founded as an independent regulatory authority in 1995, the NER was established to provide a 
means of external governance and oversight over the electricity industry (Morgan, 2002: 19; 21) The 
organisation was formed as an extension of the Department of Minerals and Energy to ensure the 
protection of consumer interests from, “the monopoly power of their suppliers” (DME, 1998b:10; 
The Presidency, 2006:2).  With regards to the IPP process, the NER had three main functions; to 
determine the price at which electricity would be supplied, to provide licenses and to develop the 
regulatory framework for IPP participation (Belinska, 2003:18; Morgan, 2002:22, 23). 
Eskom  
                                            
1 
 
  In  2009,the Department of Minerals and Energy was split into the Department of Mineral 
Resources and the Department of Energy (DOE, 2014). 
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Founded in 1923 as South Africa’s national Electricity Supply Commission, Eskom is the key supplier 
of South Africa’s electricity. (More information on the organisation and its history can be found in  
Chapter two.) 
Labour 
Though not part of the governmental executive structures, Labour represents the relationship 
between the ANC and unions as they are a part of the tripartite alliance (COSATU, 2014). The unions 
most prominent throughout the development of the crisis narrative, were the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM). 
IPPs 
IPPs are a key component in the process of achieving more generation capacity. With regards to the 
actual crisis, they had a very limited role in orchestrating events. As such, they remained minor actors 
within the crisis development scenario. 
Technocratic Visionaries  
This grouping cannot be clearly identified as a specific group of people. The development of the crisis 
points to the influence of a number of highly skilled professionals, who, responsive to some then-
prevailing global conceptions of ‘best practice’, greatly impacted the nature of the ESI policy. 
The web in the diagram below provides a diagrammatic expression of the formal and informal 
relations that existed between various key actors, across the period leading up to the 2007/8  Crisis. 




The solid black lines describe legislative relations where a legal mandate provides a clear line of 
hierarchy between the two actors. The dashed lines represent policy relations, where actors may not 
have formal jurisdiction over the other actors but maintain a position that allows them to create 
policy that will affect the actors. The dotted lines represent informal relations of influence, where 
there is no official legal relationship but where actors exert a certain amount of influence within 
various organisations.  
As the ruling party of South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC) holds a position that allows 
them to enforce a certain policy direction. The cabinet forms the executive authority within 
government and a number of high level decisions are made in cabinet and pushed forward by the 
other branches of government. The Department of Public Enterprises (DPE) and the Department of 
Minerals and Energy both fall under the jurisdiction of cabinet. Though not a formal government 
coalition, Labour represents the relationship between the ANC and unions as a part of the tripartite 
alliance (COSATU, 2014). As an SOE, Eskom reports directly to the DPE as its main shareholder. The 
DME does not have any formal control over Eskom, however, as the main government body dealing 
with energy issues, its policy decisions have a large impact on Eskom’s organisational goals and 
mandate. NER/ NERSA acts the independent regulator of the energy sector and its mandate stems 
from its position as an arm of the DME. IPPs are independent and as such have no official linkages to 
any government organisation. The legislation that governs the behaviour of IPPs within the South 
African ESI, however,  is governed by both NER and the DME. The technocratic visionaries are an 
unaligned grouping of individuals who exerted an influence over the creation of policy both in NER 
and at the DME. 
The actions of the various actors were traced over the period 1998 to 2004 and the following 
chapters describe how their interactions influenced the development of a crisis.  Chapter two 
provides a historical account of the development of the ESI within South Africa, looking at how 
Eskom came to hold its monopoly position within the sector. The chapter also provides a breakdown 
of the key issues of the 1998 Energy White Paper that will be dealt with throughout the thesis. 
Chapter three provides the testing ground for hypothesis three and explores the impact of pricing in 
policy planning, giving a brief overview of the global experience in ESI sector reform and  goes on to 
explore how policy reform was carried out in South Africa with regards to pricing. Chapter four tests 
hypothesis two and looks at how various stakeholder interests and incentives culminated in providing 
a complex arena for policy implementation. Chapter five draws the thesis to a close by providing an 











 Setting the Stage 
2.1. Eskom and South Africa’s Electricity Sector: a Short History  
The biggest change in South Africa’s electricity supply industry landscape was the publication of the 
1998 White Paper on Energy. A full 10 years before the 2008 crisis, government officials and analysts 
were already aware of its impending arrival and asserted the need for drastic action to be taken in 
order to avoid the crisis (DME,1998 : 53). The steps to be taken, were a redesign of ESI policy through 
the above mentioned White Paper, South Africa’s first cross sectoral energy plan since 1986 
(DME,1998:6). This chapter aims to provide a brief historical overview of the South African ESI and of 
the context in which the White Paper was created, providing a short introduction to some of the  
policy’s key areas of focus with regards to electricity planning. 
In 1882 the first electric streetlight was lit in Kimberley, a mining town in the heart of South Africa. 
This was a momentous occasion as the light was the first of its kind in Africa. This was ahead of the 
introduction of electric lighting in London, and the occasion set the tone of  South Africa’s Electricity 
Supply Industry as that of a thriving, forward thinking sector, closely linked to mineral interests  
(Steyn:2006:8 ; Eskom Heritage:2009; McDonald, 2012:66). 
The sector was serviced by private companies and a public electricity utility was only established in 
1923 as the Electricity Supply Commission (Escom). From its inception, Escom was designed to run as 
a not-for-profit organisation, financially independent from the state, acting semi-autonomously. This 
system raised tensions when the Electricity Bill was brought before parliament in 1920. The concerns 
that Eskom was too autonomous were pushed aside and Escom was established as a “public business 
enterprise” that reported directly to its line minister with no parliamentary accountability (Steyn, 
2006:9; Greenpeace, 2012:5).   
Escom worked towards sector control from its beginnings as an organisation and established 
monopoly control of the sector in 1948 with its purchase of the Victoria Falls Transvaal Power 
Company, leading to the vertically integrated structure present in the South African ESI today (Steyn, 
2006:9, 10; Greenpeace, 2012:5).  The  utility was run with a mission to ensure reliable cost-effective 
power with the understanding, “that the mining industry was the prime driver behind the 
establishment of the ESI and it was therefore inconceivable that its development should ever be 
stunted by shortages or poor quality of supply,” ( Steyn, 2006:11).  
The stability of the mining industry became a key issue during the OPEC crisis of the 1970s. The oil 
crisis led to a sharp spike in demand as consumers switched from oil-based generators to electricity. 
This increase in demand gave a strong push for Escom to increase the available electricity capacity in 
order to avoid shortages as, “It was considered more acceptable to end up having over capacity than 
not being able to meet demand,” (Steyn, 2006:13, 14). The decisions on how best to expand were 
made in haste and their economic and social consequences carried well into the new millennium.  
Despite the  plans to increase capacity, the long lead times in plant construction meant that Escom 
faced supply shortages in the early eighties when political unrest in Mozambique disrupted the 
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agreed upon flow from the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric scheme (Steyn, 2006:16-18). This 
destabilisation reinforced senior management’s position of “err[ing] on the side of surplus power,” in 
their investment decisions (Steyn, 2006:18).   
During the late 70s, Escom’s commitment to surplus power led to increased tariffs that incited 
political protest from white farmers, an important constituency for the South Africa’s National Party 
Government (Steyn, 2006:30). The tariff increases continued into the early eighties. The national 
government made attempts at negotiating with Escom, however, the organisation did not realise the 
importance of obtaining political backing for their planned investment projects and  subsequent tariff 
increases, a move that caused the organisation to be viewed as having, “a misplaced arrogance,” 
(Steyn, 2006:30). This arrogance led the National Party to institute the De Villiers Commission in 
1983, “A Commission of Inquiry into the Supply of Electricity in the Republic of South Africa,” (Steyn, 
2006:31). 
The Commission undertook an investigation of the South Africa’s ESI at the time and more 
particularly the way Escom ran the system.  The commission found Escom’s dedication to ensuring 
supply at any cost and noted how that motivation often led to unsound investments and wasteful 
spending.  The results of the commission were the Electricity Amendment Act of 1985 and The 
Eskom Act of 1987. The amendment abolished the Electricity Control Board that governed Eskom in 
favour of an Electricity Council that would be more representative of Escom’s consumers and would 
appoint the Management Board who would govern the day to day running of Escom.  
The Eskom Act of 1987 gave the organisation a single name of Eskom as it had previously been 
known as Escom in English and Evkom in Afrikaans. The Act also removed Eskom’s Reserve Fund, 
Capital Development Fund and Redemption Fund; these funds had previously been used to bolster 
Escom’s financials and increase access to capital for future investments (Steyn, 2006:34). The 
Commission further recommended that Escom should move away from its non-profit mandate and 
act more like a private business, a recommendation that paved the way for Eskom’s corporatisation 
in the early 2000s (EGI-SA,2010 :13). Though the commission made an impact on how Eskom related 
to government, it still allowed for the organization to run with limited external assessment 
maintaining a strong level of organisational autonomy (Steyn, 2006:34).  
The over-investment made during the apartheid era placed Eskom in the position it held in the 1990s 
as an organization with a history of 20 years of  surplus generation capacity ( Steyn, 2006:1). By 1998 
Eskom supplied 95% of South Africa’s electricity requirements, a need that equaled more than half of 
the electricity generated across the African continent and established Eskom as the natural monopoly 
of the South African electricity industry.. It controlled all of the transmission grid and supplied almost 
60% of the electricity directly to consumers through its distribution networks with the remainder 
being supplied by municipalities and other minor distributors (Eberhard,2003:7,8; Eskom, 1998).  
92% of all power produced at the time was coal based with an additional 7% generated through 
nuclear power and 1% through hydropower and emergency gas turbines (Eberhard 2001:2). The 
majority of the coal based power plants are located in the north east of the country, the single 
nuclear power station located in the Western Cape and the limited hydro capacity was located along 
the Orange River, utelising pumped  across 2 units, one in the Drakensburg and one in the Western 
Cape (Eberhard, 2001:2). 
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The national grid was integrated across provinces and comprised of 27000km of lines running 
predominantly at 400 and 275kV with a few lines running at 765, 220 and 132 kV in addition to 
533kV DC (Eberhard,2001: 2). 
The diagram below provides an overview of the South African ESI during that period. Eskom held 
monopoly power over the industry, something that policy attempted to change through the 
introduction of the 1998 White Paper. 
 
Figure 2.                                                                                                             (Eberhard 2001:15) 
On an international scale, Eskom was ranked as one of the top 5 utilities world-wide in terms of sales 
and size and was one of the world’s lowest cost electricity suppliers (Eskom, 1998) 
At the time of the White Paper on Energy, South Africa was undergoing major reforms in many of its 
state owned enterprises and a major reform of the ESI fit well into the new government’s plans for 
transformation (Eberhard, 2008:230; Eberhard, 2005:5310).Eskom did not fit the standard profile of  
a developing economy in reform as it had an excess of capacity and its balance sheet did not reveal 
the , “poor economic performance” of its investments in the late seventies and early eighties. It did 
however, fit the pre-reform structure of many industrialised countries (Steyn, 2006:38; 
Eberhard,2005:5310). It was in this light that the 1998 White Paper on Energy was presented as the 
solution to countries' excess capacity and under-electrification. 
 
2.2. The Energy White Paper of 1998 
This section of the chapter aims to provide an overview of the political context in which the White 
Paper was created and provide a brief overview of the policy’s key areas of focus.  
The political climate of a newly democratized South Africa, saw movement within government 
towards the reform and restructure of many state owned enterprises and state dominated industries 
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including Eskom (Eberhard, 2005:53120). The climate for reform was brought about by a number of 
issues, namely:  
 The political awakening of 1994 drew national attention to the lack of access to electricity for 
the black South African majority and a fractured electricity distribution industry. 
 The new government’s economic policy aimed to improve the performance of SOEs through 
corporatisation, “redefining the relationship of state as shareholder”, better definition of tax 
obligations and the introduction of independent regulatory authorities. 
 The nineties were a period of change in the international electricity climate and these new 
ways of thinking were applied to Eskom’s previous policies creating space for further discussion 
on Eskom’s policy future as analysts attempted to avoid Eskom’s previous over-investment 
models. 
 During the nineties the government experienced serious pressure to increase black 
participation in the economy and possible divestment of Eskom’s generation assets provided an 
innovative way to attempt to increase black economic empowerment (Eberhard, 2008:230; 
Eberhard, 2005:5310).  
Within the ESI this led to the creation of the 1998 White Paper on Energy, a revolutionary document 
that called for far reaching sector reforms.  As the first sectoral wide energy policy since 1986, the 
paper covered a broad spectrum of issues within the energy sector (DME, 1998:6). Its main 
objectives were the following:  
 Increasing Access to Affordable Energy Services; 
 Improving Energy Governance;  
 Stimulating Economic Development; 
 Managing  Energy-Related Environmental Impacts;  
 Securing Supply through Diversity (DME, 1998:6, 8, 9).   
The objective with the greatest impact for the structure of the South African ESI was Objective Five, 
Securing Supply through Diversity. The White Paper aimed to establish major reform in the South 
African ESI and identified the following points as key issues in need of address:  
 The 40% of South Africans who at that stage did not have access to electricity; 
 The fragmented and dysfunctional nature of the South African distribution industry;  
 The  environmental concerns of South Africa’s predominantly coal centred supply strategy 
 Management of wasteful electricity usage due to low prices; 
 Sufficient energy capacity development; 
 The need for cost reflective, affordable electricity (DME, 1998:41).  
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The Paper aimed to reform the South African ESI and bring it into line with international best practice 
whilst maintaining a system that was tailored to the country’s specific needs (DME, 1998:41). The key 
drivers for this reform were centred on the possible economic efficiency gains driven by the advance 
of new technology within the sector. The process was also pushed forward by the government’s 
vision to provide, “adequate, reliable, and low cost electricity to serve the people and industries of 
South Africa,” (DME, 1998:41). 
The policy objective of Securing Supply through Diversity was underwritten by the following policy 
goals:  
 “Giving customers the right to choose their electricity supplier; 
 Introducing competition into the industry, especially the generation sector; 
 Permitting open, non-discriminatory access to the transmission system; and 
 Encouraging private sector participation in the industry.”(DME, 1998, 29). 
The above mentioned goals meant an essential restructuring of the ESI from a vertically integrated 
model to more competitive market model. These goals however, were not the product of careful 
political canvassing or part of a plan to signal a stable market to investors but were rather, “the result 
of the convictions of a small group of analysts and government officials that were observing 
international trends in power sector reform, and were beginning to be concerned with the potential 
problems of monopoly power,” (Eberhard, 2005:5314).  
The reform of the distribution sector was seen as the primary focus, as the sector displayed the most 
need for reform within the South African ESI. Changes in transmission and generation sectors were 
also seen as necessary; yet these were secondary to the urgent changes needed in distribution (DME, 
1998:41).  
At the time of the policy, the distribution of electricity was highly fragmented with over 400 
individual distributors of electricity, a number that allowed for varying levels of service quality and 
significant price disparities. Distributors experienced high levels of non-payment that led to large 
arrears and defaults on payments. Municipal electricity departments were also supposed to provide 
financial contributions to other municipal services, a task made more difficult by the culture of non-
payment and the demands of electrification on the municipal budget (DME, 1998:41).  Addressing 
the dysfunction of the distribution industry was one of the key policy focuses of the White Paper. 
Policy aimed to address this issue through restructuring the distribution industry from a highly 
fragmented sector into a smaller number of cross-municipal Regional Electricity Distributors (REDs) 
(DME, 1998: 44). 
Towards the end of apartheid, Eskom had begun its own electrification strategy in preparation for the 
new democratic ordering ( Eskom, 1993). This plan was fairly successful and was enhanced by the 
ANC government’s Reconstruction and Development Programme (DME, 1998:7). The 1998 Paper 
aimed to bolster these efforts by making the provision for a National Electrification Fund to provide 
subsidies and help increase the rate of electrification from both municipalities and Eskom.  The 
actual policy outlining how the electrification process was to be carried out was left to a separate 
policy development process (DME, 1998:48, 49).  
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The White Paper made clear the government’s willingness to restructure the ESI and include IPPs into 
the capacity generation process. Up until that time Eskom had enjoyed the position of, “supplier of 
last resort… enjoying a de facto monopoly on the construction of new generation capacity,” (DME, 
1998:53). The White Paper aimed to alter this course of action by encouraging more players in the 
industry and developing a competitive power market (DME, 1998: 54).  
 “It is government’s intention to ensure greater public participation in future decisions on 
public expenditures of this magnitude. Government also intends to steadily increase 
competitive pressures in the generation sector in order to improve efficiencies and reduce 
electricity prices,” (DME: 1998, 53). 
This would be done through the use of integrated resource planning (IRP) methodologies in the 
development of further capacity and the renewed use of previously decommissioned power stations. 
The IRP methodology aimed to provide a transparent and structured planning process for new 
capacity development (DME, 1998: 54).  
“The compulsory use of IRP methodologies will ensure that utilities avoid or delay 
electricity supply investments, or delay decommissioning decisions, when it is economical 
to do so, by optimising the utilisation of existing capacity and increasing the efficiency of 
energy supply and consumption. The use of IRP will also contribute to meeting the 
electricity supply industry’s environmental performance. Government will establish the 
guidelines for the IRP approach through new energy legislation and regulations and will 
require the National Electricity Regulator to oversee its implementation,” (DME, 1998:53, 
54). 
In order to increase the number of players within the industry, the national transmission system  was 
encouraged to publish, “National Energy Regulator approved tariffs for the purchase of co-generated 
and independently generated electricity on the basis of full avoided costs,” (DME,1998:54).  
Environmental costs were to be included in the pricing structure in order to prioritise 
environmentally friendly generation options and research indicated the technical potential for the 
generation of 6000 MW of non-utility generation (DME, 1998:54).  The responsibility of appropriate 
tariff creation and further market research was left with the NER. The policy aimed to increase the 
competitive pressures on Eskom but was unclear on the structure and form that increased 
competition would take leaving detailed plans for further research with the view that, “Government 
will initiate a comprehensive study on future market structures for the South African electricity supply 
industry,” (DME, 1998: 55). And that “fundamental market restructuring is likely to be delayed for a 
number of years while the distribution sector restructuring and the bulk of the electrification 
programme is undertaken,” (DME, 1998:55). 
 
The primary responsibility for policy creation and the development of the ESI lay with the DME as 
can be seen from the following extract:   
 
“The department is accountable to the minister and is responsible for general governance 
of the energy sector, the formulation of long-term integrated energy policies, 
communication with stakeholders, the management of investigation and demonstration 
programmes, the management of regional and international cooperation, and ensuring 
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that appropriate institutions are established to achieve energy policy objectives,” 
(DME,1998:106).  
 
Whilst the paper failed to make any concrete prescriptions of what the South African ESI was to look 
like. It did begin to explore how South Africa’s major energy utility, Eskom could be transformed into 
an organisation capable of functioning within a more competitive market environment (DME, 1998: 
55). The paper proposed that Eskom be split into separate transmission and generation companies in 
order to create more investment opportunities for Black Economic Empowerment and other private 
sector investment. This separation would be coupled by an exploration of how Eskom’s technological 
capacity could be harnessed by the entire ESI through the separation of the Technology Research and 
Investigations Division at a future date (DME, 1998:55). The policy proposals did not make any 
overarching prescriptions against Eskom participating in new generation capacity projects. It did state 
however, that future capacity investments would have to use IRP methodologies (DME, 1998:53). 
Though  incomplete, the paper created a road map with which to bypass a possible crisis in 2007 and 
meet the electrical needs of a developing economy. As hindsight shows this policy was not foolproof 
and the following sections will show  how in spite of the best of intentions the policy failed to 
























“In its approach to electricity pricing policy the government has to achieve an 
appropriate balance between  meeting equity , economic growth and environmental 
goals . Pricing policy has to steer a clear course between affordable electricity prices 
for households, low-cost electricity for industrial consumers , prices which provide 
efficient market signals by accurately reflecting the cost of supply, and a general 



















The Role of Pricing Policy in the Development of the Crisis 
 
This chapter aims to explore Hypothesis three: The lack of investment in new generation capacity and 
the subsequent energy crisis were the direct result of the implementation of policies that lacked 
internal consistency and whose implementation required technical and administrative capabilities 
beyond those  that were available in practice.  
This will be done by looking at a particularly technical and contested portion of reform in the 
electricity arena, that of pricing policy. Examining how a lack of consistency within the policy arena 
and the sheer difficulty of creating an appropriate policy that captured all interests was fundamental 
to the failure to develop a key policy action in pricing. Additionally, how this failure led to a broader 
failure to attract investment in generation capacity as one of the key issues in ESI development 
remained unresolved. 
This will be done by providing a basic overview of how an ESI functions, looking at the trends in ESI 
policy at the time of policy development and exploring a historical perspective of pricing within the 
South African ESI. This overview will allow for an in depth analysis of how various stakeholders  
influenced the development, or lack thereof, of pricing policy in the period  between  1998-2004. 
3.1.1. Price Setting as a Function of an ESI 
 
In order to understand the role of pricing within the ESI, it is necessary to understand the basic 
functioning of an ESI. The ESI can be divided into three sub-sectors: generation, transmission and 
distribution. Generation is the process of creating electrical current, transmission is the process of 
transporting the power from high voltage power stations to distribution networks and distribution is 
the process through which electricity reaches the final consumer (Kessides, 2004: 132; Kirschen & 
Strbac, 2004:1, 3).  Electricity is a unique commodity in that unlike other resources, it cannot be 
easily or efficiently stored. This means that a sophisticated moment to moment balance is required 
between the amounts produced and those consumed at any given moment. The nature of it requires 
system-wide cohesion and functionality, as problems in a single generation plant can destabilize the 
entire system (Kirschen & Strbac, 2004:49, 133). 
Pricing within the ESI is a fairly complex issue because the production costs of generating electricity 
are not necessarily the same as the tariffs charged to consumers. The table below provides a 
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The table provides a matrix of the various pricing regimes that can be instituted for both consumers 
and generators. The horizontal axis represents the pricing options for consumers, Social Welfare Cost 
and Replacement Cost and the vertical axis represents different electricity market structures and 
pricing regimes to generators; Competitive Market, Take or Pay Contract, No Private Participation.  
Theoretically, it is possible for there to be two different pricing structures for consumers and 
producers, where the government would charge consumers the  Social Welfare Cost with generators 
producing at  the Replacement Cost and the fiscus covering the difference in pricing .  
The Social Welfare Cost is one of the pricing options available to parastatals that focuses on resource 
allocation and how various cost structures can affect incentives within the rest of society  (Turvey & 
Anderson, 1977:11).  Within this model, parastatals consider, the current resource allocation and 
incentive effects of various cost structures: the equity implications of various prices (in particular 
how low income households will access electricity), and the way in which price changes can distort 
previously established equity objectives (Turvey & Anderson, 1977:10). This form of costing means 
that  the SOE will be loss-making, will be dependent on the government to provide financial support 
and as such be vulnerable to interference in their operating processes (Weaver, 1985:160,161).  
Alternatively, the Replacement Cost focuses on ensuring that the cost charged to consumers is 
sufficient to cover the costs of production.   
In the Competitive Market Model, electricity is traded like other commodities with prices set on the 
basis of supply and demand in both a spot and forward market. This can take the form of either 
Retail or Wholesale competition. In wholesale competition, various distributors purchase  electricity 
from competitive generators and distribute this through the transmission network to specified 
service areas or through open access agreements. In retail competition, consumers have direct 
access to competing generators where transmission and distribution operate according to open 
access agreements ( Kessides, 2004:144, 150).   
The Take or Pay Model works on the basis of a particular type of power purchase agreement. Power 
Purchase Agreements are long term contracts (15-20 years) to purchase electricity from a given 
supplier. The supplier maintains a predetermined amount of electricity generation over the period 
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and it is the buyer’s responsibility to purchase the agreed amount of electricity (Kessides, 2004:144; 
Thumann & Woodruff, 2009:93).  The tendering process to obtain a PPA should ideally occur in a 
competitive manner and as such provide some of the benefits of competition such as lowered 
generation costs (Kessides, 2004:149).  The model along with other long term contract models 
represents competition for the market as opposed to competition in the market (Jamsab, 2006:22). 
The Competitive Market Model , offers  competition in the market and a more dynamic market than 
the Take or Pay Model. However,  the model requires  strong institutional and regulatory capacity to 
manage the markets ,  large enough capacity to warrant sufficient unaffiliated suppliers and a reliable 
transmission network  (Jamsab, 2006:22; Kessides, 2004:150-152).  It also does not provide investors 
with much certainty and as such is difficult to obtain in transitional economies  Take or Pay Models 
are often preferred  for  developing and transitional economies as  they  promote  investment , 
require minimal  organisational  transformation.   Both the competitive market model and the Take 
or Pay Model can fit into vertically integrated systems using a single buyer model  
(Jamsab,2006:22,23).  
The single buyer model is where the state maintains a point of market authority by being the sole 
buyer for generated power within the market. Within this model, the generation sector and the 
distribution sector could theoretically be privatised whilst the state maintains the transmission line  
(Kessides, 2004:151,152).  
The No Private Participation model, follows the traditional structures of the ESI, whereby the entirety 
of the production process from generation to distribution is housed within a single vertically 
integrated state owned organisation. This system is based on the assumed natural monopolies within 
the ESI, the ability to benefit from economies of scale and the necessity of system wide balance for a 
functional system (Kessides, 2004:133). This was the dominant system of governance   internationally 
for most of the twentieth century. This mode of market organisation became problematic because 
the capital intensive nature of investment in electricity  utilities meant that  whilst governments were 
able to provide electricity at below replacement costs (as the operating costs were only half of the 
total costs). The level of underpricing meant they were unable to amass the finance necessary for 
new capital investment when old plants ran down. The context of a government run utility provided 
few incentives  to operate efficiently and maintain a sustainable level of capital  investment  which 
often meant that as  services degenerated and fell into disrepair and as demand grew, new 
investments were difficult to finance (Kessides, 2004: 3,137,142).   
3.1.2.  Pricing and the Attraction of Private Investment  
Investing in new generation capacity follows many of the same principles as other large capital 
investments. In order to invest in new generation capacity, investors need to know the revenues 
earned from the plant will be greater than the initial investment costs as well as the operating costs 
of the firm over its lifespan (Kirschen & Strbac, 2004:206). The profits earned from the venture 
should also be greater than profits that could be earned in any other investment with a similar risk 
profile (Kirschen & Strbac, 2004:206). Profits are assessed by calculating the Long Run Marginal Costs 
of the plant, including the expected rate of return and by comparing this cost with the forecasted 
price at which output from the plant can be sold.  A decision to invest in new generation capacity will 
be dependent on whether the estimated profits are greater than the Long Run Marginal Cost.  
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The above description provides a simplified example of the decision making process. In reality, the 
process is far more complex with high levels of uncertainty for both the profit and cost margins.   The 
Long Run Marginal Cost can be altered through changes in fuel prices which affect the running costs 
or delays in construction that affect the initial investment amounts.  Long run prices are even more 
difficult to determine as they are influenced by a myriad of factors such as national stability, 
increases in demand, technological advancement   and increased competition. 
As such, new generation developments are normally supported  by  upstream and downstream fixed 
contracts. Upstream contracts fix the price of  fuel inputs and downstream  contracts set the price  at 
which the energy will be sold. These contracts help to reduce the risks faced by investors by ensuring 
that the investor only bears the risk of operating the plant.  Generation plants generally have a life 
span of 20 to 40 years and the various profit calculations are made accordingly (Kirschen & Strbac, 
2004:206). 
The nature of the market structure into which a new investment is made affects the process of 
development. In a  Competitive Market Model, prices are not  guaranteed. Both price and investors 
are exposed to more risk and are more likely to be subjected to the whims of the market. Whilst in 
the Take or Pay Model, contracts are signed for the life cycle of the plant to help reduce the risk and 
create a more hospitable environment for investment.  Regardless of the mode chosen, new capacity 
investment remains a very expensive task and the differing market models provide varying levels of 
risk. Whether a government chooses to pursue social welfare costing or allow for replacement 
costing, sourcing  funds to pay for the new investment in generation capacity remains key. 
3.2 Competition and Private Participation: the Global Experience  
The OPEC oil crisis of the 1973 brought electricity supply issues to the forefront of policy debate and 
led to major investments in new generation projects  internationally (Czamanski, 1999:11; Kessides, 
2004: 135). It was only in the 1980s, that a prominent movement was made to restructuring ESIs 
from the traditional vertically integrated structure to alternative market models. The first major 
reformers were Chile in 1982 and the UK in 1989 (Kessides, 2004: 137,172; Czamanski, 1999:40). 
The pattern of reform differed for developed and developing nations. In developed countries, reform 
processes were introduced to improve already efficient systems, whilst for many developing nations 
reform measures were a movement to address issues of underinvestment and deteriorating  public 
infrastructure ( Kessides, 2004:2; Jamsab, 2006:14).  
For a number of  developing countries the public infrastructure systems failed to provide functional 
electricity systems necessary to meet the growth challenges of the 20th century. Though initially 
successful, inflation and political motivations meant that a lot of electricity utilities were unable to 
charge prices that reflected the cost of electricity production, much less the cost of future 
investment.  “Underpricing for favoured groups became more noticeable politically , yet harder to 
reverse,” (Kessides, 2004:137).  The lack of adequate pricing systems meant that utilities often fell 
into disrepair and also  increased the level of instability in electricity supply (Kessides, 2004:137). This 
along with the investment   needs of developing economies increased pressure to move towards 
more  private participation and more competitive market structures as a means of addressing those 
shortcomings.  
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3.2.1 Chile and the Market Model 
Latin America was where the first major reforms started and was also the region most impacted by 
the standard reform model. Chile’s initial reforms were followed by similar reforms across the region 
in Argentina, Peru , Bolivia,  Colombia,  Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico and  Venezuela (Kessides,2004:172).  
Chile provided a reform path that was highly influential in shaping the reform policies of other 
countries in the region.  The initial steps in restructuring  were to develop  regulatory infrastructure, 
to provide the enterprises that would be privatised with experience of a regulatory framework. This 
was done concurrently with the reinforcement of  property rights as a means to assuage investor 
fears of expropriation. The process moved slowly and increased confidence in the possibility for 
reform in the developing world. The program aimed to “achieve vertical and horizontal unbundling,, 
competition in generation, centralized power pool, open access to the transmission network, 
yardstick  competition in distribution, and for large  users freedom to purchase power from any 
generator or distributor,” (Kessides, 2004:172). 
 In 1986, Chile began the active restructuring of their ESI by dividing Endesa, the  vertically 
integrated, state owned electricity utility into six generation companies , six distribution companies 
and two smaller companies in  southern Chile that were both  generation and distribution. By 1991, 
the numbers had increased to, “11 generation companies, 21 distribution companies and two 
integrated companies.” A 2000 study showed, however,  that whilst there was  a seemingly 
competitive market environment, 93% of installed generation capacity and 90% of total generation 
capacity was controlled by three companies the largest of these, Endesa, with a 58% share in 
generation power also controlled 40% of distribution  and  until the early  2000s was the country’s 
main transmission  company (Kessides, 2004:173). 
3.2.2. East Asia and the Single Buyer Model 
Many East Asian countries opted for the single buyer model in the early nineties. Power shortages 
across the region from the late eighties onwards, accompanied by rapid economic growth prompted 
movements towards single buyer models where IPPs were invited to compete for long term power 
purchase agreements with state owned single buyer utilities and government guarantees. 
Throughout the first part of the nineties the, process was largely successful attracting $54.6 billion in 
private investment in electricity, over 40% of the worldwide investment in electricity during the 
period for developing and transitional economies (Kessides,2004:177,178). 
The East Asian financial crisis of 1997 put the model into serious jeopardy. Many of the power 
purchase agreements that had been negotiated were in foreign currency and the currency collapse 
meant that the cost of electricity doubled, an expense that few governments were willing to pass on 
to consumers(Kessides,2004:178,179).  
The crisis also decreased electricity demand and placed pressures on governments to back out of 
deals or to attempt to renegotiate PPAs. In countries such as the Philippines, the debt of the national 
electricity utility amounted to more than 20% of the national debt.  The crisis made it, “clear that this 
form of private investment in power generation is equivalent to expensive foreign debt,” (Kessides, 
2004:179). By 2006, many of the PPAs that had been made prior to 1997 in the region  had failed to 
materialize (Jamsab, 2006:16). Whilst pre-1997 reform planning focused on obtaining private 
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investment, the effects of the 1997 crisis meant a sharp decrease in private investment, the 
permanence of which has yet to be established (Kessides, 2004:169).  
The differences in reform style in Latin America and in East Asia led to different distributions of 
investment. 80% of industry investments in Latin American and Caribbean countries were in 
divestiture projects. Whereas 80% of industry investment in East Asian Pacific and South  Asian 
countries were in greenfield investments (Jamsab, 2006:15).  
3.3. South African Historical Pricing  
South Africa’s electricity pricing structure was largely shaped by its investment financing structure. 
Established as a self-financing organisation, set to operate , “neither at profit nor at loss” Escom’s 
prices were set according to the estimates of the following year’s electricity sales. The revenue 
generated from sales was to be no more than necessary to, “cover production costs, contributions to 
the Interest Fund (to cover expected annual interest charges), contributions to the Loan Redemption 
Fund (to provide for loan amortisation), and small contributions to the Reserve Fund (used to finance 
the eventual replacement of existing plant),” there was  no allowance for the depreciation of assets. 
New capital had to be financed from debt alone (Steyn, 2006:23, 24).  This section aims to broadly 
trace South Africa’s pricing history by looking at the price patterns from 1950 to 2005.  




In the immediate post Second World War  years, Escom was unable to meet the electricity demand 
due to a shortage of skilled labour  and this led to a rationing of electricity. This rationing was felt 
quite dearly by the gold mining industry  and high level meetings with various stakeholders were held 
to discuss  solutions to the problem ( Steyn, 2006:11).   During this period, Escom undertook to 
connect their infrastructure through means of a national grid, a project that would allow for new 
modes of plant development and improve access to economies of  scale (Steyn, 2006:11). Four new 
power  projects were set into motion between  1964 and 1968 thus, ensuring that South Africa was 
able to maintain  a healthy  reserve margin in spite of an economic boom experienced in the sixties. 
25 
As the cost of new investment was  to be accessed from debt alone, this had a limited impact on the 
price of electricity .  
In the early seventies however, it became apparent that a debt-dominated capital structure could 
prove problematic in the long run  and  in 1971, the Electricity Amendment  Act was instituted.  The 
Electricity Amendment Act allowed Escom to accumulate savings for future capital investment in the 
Capital Development Fund. This act, along with a later amendment that allowed for the consolidation 
of transmission and generation activities, was said to have, “removed the last theoretical possibility 
of regulatory involvement in its  investment planning,” (Steyn, 2006:25).  
After the completion of the national grid in 1973, Escom developed a plan to steadily increase 
generation capacity by 3900MW over 10 years.  From 1971-1975, however,  the demand growth 
rates far exceeded expectations reaching a peak in 1974 when demand grew by 16.35%, the highest 
yearly growth rate in a 40 year period ( Steyn, 2006:12,13).  The situation grew precarious when by 
1975, the capacity reserve margin had dropped to 11%,  6% below the 17% reserve margin that was 
considered acceptable. 
At the time Escom top management was headed by men who had  begun their Eskom tenure during 
the shortages of the 1950s and  held a distinct aversion to interrupting economic progress with a lack 
of power supply. As such, “It was considered more acceptable to end up having over capacity than 
not being able to meet demand,” and  approximately 15562 MW of new generation capacity was 
ordered  between 1974 and 1979, in addition to the construction of the Koeberg Nuclear Power 
Station that began in 1976 (Steyn, 2006:14,15). Over the period 1975-1985, Escom’s capital 
expenditure tripled in real terms and  was multiplied eleven-fold in nominal terms (Steyn, 2006:25). 
The organisation  clearly expressed its intent to finance, “50% of capital expenditure from internal 
resources,” (Steyn, 2006:27). It was across this period that the largest increases in prices were 
experienced.  
By 1985, it became apparent that Eskom’s demand projections for electricity had been over 
estimated and  there began the serious work  of dealing with excess capacity and, “finance related 
problems,” (Steyn, 2006:35). The De Villiers Commission was instituted in 1983 and drew to a close 
in 1985. The commission identified, “investment incentive problems,” which led to the 1987  Eskom 
Act that removed the Reserve Fund, the Capital Development Fund and the Redemption Fund,” 
altering Eskom’s pattern of capital accumulation for investment (Steyn,2006:34).  
From 1987 Eskom  put forward  below inflation price increases however,  these did little to reduce  
debt and there was a move for higher increases. This move was met with opposition from  some 
quarters of government however, these areas of conflict helped to pave the way for the suggestion of  
a pricing compact. Whereby Eskom undertook to decrease the real price of electricity by  1996 in 
exchange for increased organisational autonomy ( Steyn, 2006:40).  
By 1998, South Africa had experienced 13 years of decreasing electricity prices and an excess capacity 
reserve and it was in this context that the South African White Paper on Energy was developed. 
With regards to pricing, the policy made very clear specifications about how  international trends in 
energy policy had a significant impact on national planning development and how there was a strong 
global push towards more cost reflective market based pricing (DME, 1998:20,21). This movement 
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was mitigated by the  levels of poverty within the South African context and there was a strong drive 
to move towards  a combination of pricing mechanisms that, “ moderately subsidised tariffs for poor 
domestic consumers,” (DME, 1998:51). It was determined that the price at  which IPPs could  sell 
power into the national transmission grid would be available through the publication of National 
Electricity Regulator approved tariffs that were based on full avoided costs encountered in the 
independent generation of electricity (DME,1998:54).  The policy however, failed to put forward any 
official ideas as to what a revamped market would look like, putting all  fundamental market 
restructuring on hold until the issues of distribution and electrification had been dealt with (DME, 
1998:55).  
3.4. Process Tracing: the South African Pricing Experience 
As of 1998/9, in the immediate aftermath of the White Paper, there were multiple disparate goals 
and perspectives as to how electricity should be priced in South Africa, pulling policy in opposite 
directions. These included movements towards: 
 The introduction of  a moment to moment competitive market model; 
 Plans to ensure social welfare pricing with the provision of free basic electricity and 
poverty tariffs; 
 Support for plans to increase electricity prices as a means to attract private investment; 
 Opposition to Eskom’s attempts to increase prices; 
 Private sector opposition to price increases. 
Using the process tracing tool as set out in the Methodology section of the paper, a detailed 
historical narrative was developed to  explore pricing policy  debates over the period  1998 to 2004. 
2004 was chosen as the end point as it represented the point at which ESI policy saw a major shift 
and returned its focus to state controlled development of the ESI. 
Newspaper articles and academic literature were used as the primary information source to 
construct the narrative. Newspaper articles were surveyed on the SA Media online database using 
the key words electricity and pricing. The results of the search were then examined for topical  
relevance and the relevant articles were used to create the following narrative of how pricing policy 
unfolded in South Africa over the period 1998-2004.  







Tableof Stakeholder Actions and Goals 




Was  initially supportive of the 
adoption of a moment to moment 
pricing model and provided the 
directional model for Eskom as an 
organization. 
• Pushed for a moment to moment model in the 
separation of Eskom into three separate parts in 
order to develop a competitive hourly market.  
• Announced that there were no plans to privatise 
Eskom nor to move electricity price setting away 
from the jurisdiction of the NER. 
 Announced that Eskom would be the champion of 





The department’s goal was to ensure 
affordable electricity for all South 
Africans. 
 Reinstated the poverty tariff. 
 Announced plans to provide all South African 
households with 110kw of free electricity. 
• Denied Eskom’s appeal for a tariff increase. 
 Introduced plan to provide R 300 million worth of 




Had no clear policy development over 
the period except to ensure that 
Eskom did not increase prices too 
drastically. 
• Pushed for the removal of the poverty tariff.  
•  Limited the price increases requested by Eskom. 
• Made a presentation on the unsustainability of South 
African electricity prices. 
• Refused Eskom’s request to increase tariffs due to 
capacity issues.  
Eskom Tried to increase prices to cost-
reflective levels. 
• Pushed for above inflation tariff increases. 
• Re-introduced time of use tariffs . 
• Created an internally competitive dummy power 
pool. 
•  Attempted to phase out the cross-subsidization of 
tariffs. 
• Pushed for above inflation tariff increases. 
• Proposed gradual price increases over time as 
opposed to a big bang price increase in the future. 
Labour  Was against any price increases.  • Protested the removal of the poverty tariff. 
• Threatened a strike at the Eskom Conversion Bill. 
• Cosatu accused government of reneging on promises 
to cross- subsidize tariffs for poorer South Africa. 
• Objected to proposed tariff increases 
IPPs (Energy  
Based Private 
Sector) 
Were pushing for higher prices.   Produced reports stating the need to increase 
the prices of  electricity in order to attract 
investments. 
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 Non-Energy  
Based Private 
Sector 
Were against the increase of prices.  •  Brought price discrepancies in different  
municipalities into the public forum 
• Raised public debate on the use of tariffs for 
municipal funding 
• Lodged complaints with the Competition Commission 
that NER was allowing too high prices. 
Table 2 
The Pricing Story 
 The table below provides a guideline to help locate South Africa’s pricing position relative to the 
possible options within the system. The numbers will be referred to in the following section to help 








 Take or Pay Contract 
3.Private Company 




with Long Term 
Contract 
No Private Participation 
1. Loss Making 
SOE 







At the publication of the White Paper, South Africa’s ESI pricing policy lay in section 1. in the lower 
left hand section in the table above, this meant that there was no private participation in the ESI and 
the prices charged to consumers were done so at a socially optimum level.  In period 1 there was an 
attempt by some stakeholders to move towards a replacement cost. 
3.4.1. Period 1: July 1999- November 2000 
In  July 1999, during the unfolding of the restructuring process, the NER proposed the scrapping of  
the poverty tariff.  Introduced in 1998, the poverty tariff aimed to provide cheaper electricity for the 
poorer South Africans at Eskom’s cost. In its restructuring discussions, the NER had proposed that the 
tariff be put on hold. This created a lot of unrest with labour.  Steven Nphlapho, spokesman for the 
National Union of Metalworkers (NUMSA), announced the organisation’s dissatisfaction with the 
movement towards the restructuring of the ESI and in particular the possible scrapping of the 
‘poverty tariff’.  Nphlapho stated that, “Shelving the poverty tariffs, when the Government had 
displayed its commitment to fast service delivery for the poor  and ensuring a better life for all, is 
unacceptable and will be strongly resisted by the union movement,” (Hlangani,1999:6; Chalmers 
1999a:16). 
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In December of 1999, Eskom and the NER reached their first dispute concerning a price increase. 
Prior to 1999, all of Eskom’s price increases had been below inflation as part of Eskom’s price 
compact to reduce the real price of electricity by 15%  from 1994 to 2000. Then at the end of 1999 
Eskom requested an above inflation increase  of 7% (Chalmers, 1999b:1). A compromise was 
achieved of a 5.5% increase , 1.5 % lower than Eskom’s original request (Chalmers, 1999b:1).  
In the same month, Minister of Public Enterprises, Jeff Radebe announced that Eskom would be 
unbundled into three separate businesses: generation, transmission and distribution,  – by March 
2000.  This move was an attempt to draw closer to the goal of an electricity market power pool 
where, ‘Competing generation companies would submit  electricity prices to a central transmission 
authority on an hourly basis. Distributors would then buy the cheapest power to distribute to 
consumers.” This model  would be similar to the moment  to moment model held in  many 
industrialised countries (Bailey, 1999:1). 
In March 2000, Joe Randall,  national sales manager of  National Utility  Services South Africa brought 
to light the fact that South African users faced extreme price disparities with a system that had 
almost 2000 different tariff structures. A more standardized pricing structure was expected to be 
assumed when the regional electricity distributors were formed in 2001 through the merger of 
Eskom’s and municipal distribution structures.  Addressing the price disparities at a distribution level  
formed one of  Eskom’s top priorities at the time (Bailey, 2000a:5).  There was growing concern that 
the  addition of  REDs would lead to increased  electricity prices, a sentiment put forth in a Price 
Waterhouse project that projected  that a 50% increase in price was necessary in order to make REDs 
a viable option.  Deputy director general for energy in the Department of Minerals and Energy,  
Smunda Mokoena  dismissed claims stating that the proposals were still under  discussion and review 
(Xundu, 2000:3). 
In their 1999/2000 Annual report, NER made the following statement that it, “will not license 
additional generation capacity that is based on inflexible long-term power purchase agreements. This 
stance is based on the premise that customers should be protected against being deprived  of the 
benefits of a future competitive electricity market,” ( PARI, 2013:13).  
In 2000, Eskom applied for a 6.2% increase in prices. In November of that year, NER capped the 
increase at 5.2%  with NER  chief executive, Xolani Makwanazi  stating that, “This is a signal that we 
want to commit to affordable electricity. If we start showing price spikes we will scare off investors 
who depend on cheap electricity and that could have a huge impact on the economy.” Makwanazi 
revealed that the most important deciding factor for the price increases was the inflation rate (Bailey, 
2000b:1). 
Minister of the Department of Minerals and Energy, Pumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka announced 
government’s approval of a “poverty tariff” to help poor households access energy. The shape of the 
tariff had yet to be defined but was similar to the poverty tariff shelved in 1999 (Chalmers, 2000a:1). 
Later in the same month,  Minister Mlambo-Ngcuka announced that the government had agreed in 
principal to provide 110kw of free electricity to all South African households from April 2001. The 
program was aimed at poor households. The logistical difficulties in identifying households meant 
that all would most likely receive the free power (Zondi, 2000). In response, Eskom  announced the 
re-introduction of time-of-use tariffs as a way to compensate for the low price increases granted by 
the NER (Chalmers, 2000b:6). 
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 Period 1  saw the initial attempts to provide a congruent pricing policy fail through the removal and 
reinstatement of the poverty tariff as well and the push and pull of electricity price increases. South 
Africa remained firmly in cell 1. 
3.4.2. Period 2:  April 2001- August 2002 
In period 2, there was a movement from Eskom to transfer pricing policy from cell 1 to cell 2 in the 
table above, moving to a system with an internally competitive supply structure and to a more cost 
reflective pricing. Whilst the attempt at increased prices faced stern opposition, the organisation was 
able to instate a dummy power pool within the organisation that simulated real market interaction. 
By April 2001, South Africa had the cheapest electricity in the world. In a paper presented at the 
Domestic Use of Energy Conference by Mangaliso Mngomezulu and S.D. Salvodi of Eskom, it was 
stated that, “If the price of electricity is to be kept down, the expansion of generation capacity will 
have to be avoided. One of the most effective ways of deferring the expansion of generation capacity 
is to shift and reschedule the use of electricity from peak periods to lower-cost periods during which 
electricity usage is lower,” (Yutar, 2001:13). 
Internally, Eskom had made great strides towards a competitive market by re-shaping its generation 
sector into five separate competing units. This was an experiment to create a dummy power pool 
using implements from the UK and Australian models (Chalmers, 2001a:17). 
In May, various groups had raised concerns about the possible increase in prices as Eskom moved 
towards privatisation. Ian Davidson, DA MP expressed the party’s concern over  what the party saw 
as, “the inevitable huge increase in the price of electricity which is contemplated by Eskom as a result 
of the corporatisation of the utility,” (The Star, 2001:6).  COSATU raised its concern at what they 
perceived to be a move towards privatisation and they made clear their  intention to enact a national 
strike against the Eskom Conversion Bill. Its general secretary, Zwelinzima Vavi stated that, “Cosatu 
believes  that it is only through public ownership  and control that basic services such as electricity  
can be universally provided on an affordable and sustainable basis to all South Africans” (The Star, 
2001:6). 
In order to assuage some of the concerns of increased pricing raised by the Eskom Conversion Act, 
Jeff Radebe, Minister of the Department of Public Enterprises wrote an article in   Business Day.  The 
article made it clear that whilst the Eskom Conversion Act had transformed  Eskom  into a limited 
liability company there was no “Policy to sell Eskom to the private sector and leave the provision of 
electricity to market forces,” and that, “Claims that the bill will lead to price hikes were unfounded. 
The electricity price is set and regulated by the National Electricity Regulator,” (Radebe, 2001:10). 
In September 2001, Eskom announced its plans to phase out cross-subsidization between different 
tariff structures. In November of the same year, Cosatu, “accused the government of reneging on an 
election pledge to cross-subsidize electricity tariffs to the poor.” Cosatu alleged that cabinet  had 
previously announced that  the subsidy system would only come  under review in 2003 when social 
impact studies had been undertaken, a statement at odds with Eskom’s announcement to remove 
subsidies ( Kindra,2001:9).  
In November 2001, Eskom strove to introduce an in-house designed  Wholesale Electricity Pricing 
System ( WEPS). The programme aimed to align tariffs with the actual  cost of  supply reducing cross-
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subsidization in pricing. The tariffs were to be phased in over a five to 10 year  period . Its expected 
outcomes were uncertain but there was concern that it would lead to higher prices for domestic 
users and smaller bulk buyers, but lower prices for larger bulk buyers as the WEPS system also 
affected retail tariffs.  One of the certainties of the project was that new means of financing indigent 
customers would need to be found. The NER expressed concern at the abuse of WEPS stating  that 
the challenge was, “ to ensure that cost-reflectivity does not mean that utilities can be inefficient in 
running their business, yet be able to apply for a price rise,” (Singh, 2001:50).  
In December 2001, the NER was looking at ways to prepare the South African ESI for a more 
competitive environment by transforming Eskom’s internal power into a national power pool.  The 
power pool would allow distributors to purchase power either through a market or through a  single 
wholesale operator. The internal power pool had been set up in 1999 and was initially trading at high 
prices that decreased over time as staff learned how to trade efficiently in the system. Other models 
under consideration were the Norwegian system of electricity trading with “an independent 
transmission system, and a power exchange open to all players,” (Chalmers, 2001b:2).  
In March 2002, Minister of Public Enterprise, Jeff Radebe, announced in Parliament that, “ The 
government and Eskom  are considering ways to make  electricity cheaper and more accessible.” One 
of the major problems faced in restructuring prices was the R2,122 billion  of unpaid bills, R277,2 
million of which was owed by municipalities ( Stuart, 2002:6).  
An August 2002 study published by NUS consulting group found that there were extreme differences 
of up to 75% between prices charged by different municipalities. It was found that most 
municipalities were using the mark-up in electricity tariffs to finance other council  issues (West, 
2002:4). 
By the end of period two no concrete steps had been taken towards providing a cohesive reformed 
pricing policy. Eskom remained firmly in cell 1 even though the policy plans created indicated that cell 
6 was the ideal endpoint. 
3.4.3. Period 3: March 2002-October 2004 
In period 3 there was increased awareness of the problematic nature of South Africa’s then pricing 
structure. This was still subject to the constant push and pull of tariff increases that had occurred 
from period 1. No clear attempts to move to any point on the table above could be identified.  
In March 2003, after paying a dividend of R500 million to the Department of Minerals and Energy, 
Eskom announced plans to increase its tariffs at a rate above inflation. The increase in tariffs was to 
fund a capital expenditure project aimed at the mining sector over 5 years. This announcement was 
met with remonstrations from the National Consumer Union, Sanco and the UDM ( Matyu,2003:7). 
In April, deputy minister of the Department of Minerals and Energy, announced the government’s 
plans to provide R300 million worth of free basic electricity by July 2003 (wa Sekano, 2003:4).  
At a meeting of the parliamentary committee on minerals and energy, Dr Wolsely Barnard of the NER 
announced that South Africa  could be facing a major energy crisis in the next four to eight years 
depending on the levels of demand. In order to combat this, new generation capacity would have to 
be developed. Unfortunately , at the time, Eskom  was generating electricity at a rate of 10c  a unit 
whereas , the, “‘ levelised cost’  for a new coal-fired power station was about 25c a unit.”  A  point at 
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which Professor Anton Eberhard noted, “That just tells you that the price we have at the moment is 
economically unsustainable,” (SAPA, 2003:6).  In the presentation, representatives from the NER tried 
to enforce the idea that the increase in prices was due to the need for the new investment and not 
the possible restructuring of the organisation (Loxton, 2003:9).  
Some actors within the private sector, such as Mike Schussler of Tradek,  put forth  the argument that 
South African regulators including NER, “were only listening to the parastatals and should have done 
more research before authorising increases.” The  Competition Commision had received several 
complaints about excessive price increases at Eskom and other parastatals ( Wray, 2003:5). 
Eskom  spokesperson, Fani Zulu , stated that there was 'upward pressure on the price of electricity’ 
but he said that “over the years electricity  prices had been kept artificially low.” Zulu projected that 
prices would have to increase in the future and that there was a choice to be made to either accept 
gradual increases or succumb to a “big bang” in the future. A senior industry source who chose to 
remain anonymous said that, “Current electricity pricing reflected an inherent contradiction in policy 
and was tantamount to letting , “politics trump economics.” “They want to restructure the industry 
and attract investment but they are not willing to allow  market forces to set prices.”  There was an 
awareness from some industry insiders that Eskom was charging, “half the economic cost of 
electricity,” (Wray, 2003:4). 
In an aim to meet the policy action put forth in the  1998 Energy White Paper, Eskom proposed the 
division of its tariffs for large urban users into energy and network charges. These changes would 
come along with the NER proposed reduction of subsidies on agricultural tariffs ( Phasiwe, 2003a:2). 
In October 2003, the NER refused to allow Eskom to increase prices in order to pay for new capital 
expenditure. Eskom stated that it had meant the refurbishment of older power station as opposed to 
investment in new ones. The NER  chief executive, Xolani Mkhwanazi stated that whilst the 
development of new capacity was a serious issue to be dealt with at a national level, “We do not 
agree with the principle that  says increase electricity prices  in order to accumulate  massive monies 
for future investments,”(Nxumalo, 2003:5). 
In July, Eskom had applied for an 8.5% increase in prices in order to better facilitate capacity 
development. In October the NER  approved a 2.5% increase, stating, “Eskom has the capacity to 
build new plants without increasing real prices now,” and expressing the belief that, “There is no 
guarantee Eskom will be required to build new generation capacity,” (Phasiwe,2003b:3). 
Private sector actors such as, Phillip Lloyd,  a consultant at Industrial and Petrochemical  Consultants, 
came out in support of Eskom’s proposals of gradual price increases over a longer period. He also 
expressed the view that the 2.5% increase granted by the NER could scare off  potential investors. 
“There is  no incentive for new independent power producers  to enter the market because the 
prices they get for their product are too low. There is no way in which new generation capacity  can 
be brought into production  at much less than twice the  present average cost,” (Phasiwe, 2003b:3).  
In December of 2003, Eskom lodged a formal appeal against the price increase granted by the NER to 
the Minister of the Department of Minerals and Energy, Phumzile Mlambo-Ncgucka (Phasiwe, 2003c: 
2).  The NER responded by requesting that Eskom withdraw its appeal or risk losing the 2.5% increase 
it had been granted (Phasiwe,2003d:2).  
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Whilst consumers were happy with the 2.5% price increase granted by the NER in 2004, industry 
insiders suggested that the minimal increase was  the by-product of  2004 being an election year. This 
stance was further supported by  a statement by the department of minerals and energy saying that, 
“It did not  want electricity prices to soar when government was trying to expand the economy,” 
(Singh, 2004:40).  
In May, the national government upheld the NER’s decision to allow a 2.5% tariff increase,  
maintaining  previous statements that new capacity was to be built by private companies. Industry 
analysts, however, said that such a low increase could deter private investment (Phasiwe, 2004a:2). 
At that time  South Africa was  the lowest cost energy producer internationally, 24% lower than the 
next cheapest country, Canada (Phasiwe, 2004b:2).  
In October, the NER granted a price increase of 6.4% to Eskom, this increase had some analysts 
worrying about the inflationary pressures of rising electricity prices (Shezi,2004:1). In that same 
week, the Minister of Public Enterprises, Alec Erwin announced that Eskom would be the main 
champion of South African Capacity Development (Chalmers, 2004:13). 
As of the end of period 3, factions that favoured a continuation of lower (‘social welfare’) pricing had 
seemingly won the day. As events over the following half-dozen years would reveal this was an 
illusory  (Pyrrhic) victory, with all major pricing issues left unresolved. South Africa remained in the 
pricing position it had held at the beginning of the process. 
3.4.4. Concluding Remarks  
The 1998 White Paper suggested very clear reform goals to create a  pricing model with market  
based pricing and that accounted for the poor through carefully designed subsidies and pricing 
options ( DME, 1998:55). This policy did not account for the structural and political context in which 
such a policy would have to be enacted. 
In the period following the publication of the policy, various stakeholders attempted to assert their 
views on key issues in pricing policy without actually creating a clear narrative on what a cohesive 
pricing policy should look like. The policy  pushed in one direction whilst various stakeholders  such 
as Labour and Eskom, pushed in other directions.  This created a level of market uncertainty because 
though initial policy had highlighted the NER as  a key participant in regulating the pricing of private 
participants in a more competitive market model, no actual policy on the exact nature of  what that 
policy would look like was developed ( DME, 1998:55). 
Global practice showed that regardless of the model chosen, introducing reform into the ESI was a 
very complex matter that required clear policy direction and measured implementation. The 1998-
2004 back and forth movement over pricing, failed entirely to put in place a pricing regime capable 
of  attracting private investment. The initial policy suggested a moment to moment competitive 
market; yet no concrete measures were taken in that direction, due to a very public resistance to 
anything that resembled privatisation. The other alternative of take or pay long term contracts were 
strongly opposed by the regulatory forces responsible for creating regulatory framework.  
These debates also seemed to occur with little regard for the time pressures associated in developing 
new generation capacity  as well as the fact that new capacity would have inevitably needed a 
financer of some sort. The extent to which electricity prices could be used to cover the cost of  
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generation capacity investment was insufficiently explored. These issues came to the forefront after 
the decision had been made to re-instate Eskom as the primary developer of new generation 
capacity. 
After the announcement of  Eskom’s new build programme,  cabinet approved a five year investment 
plan to upgrade the electricity infrastructure covering the three main sectors of generation, 
transmission and distribution. The initial budget was at R93 billion, R10 billion of which was to be 
provided by  IPPs.  By 2006, the budget for this build programme increased to  R150 billion, 70% of 
which as to be allocated to generation projects.  The increased investment was not able to prevent a 
crisis and  at the end of 2007, South African began to experience major blackouts across the nation. 
Post-crisis in 2009, the estimated costs of the development had sky rocketed and this increased 
approved investment to R395 billion with limited movement towards any fundamental reform of 





























“The notion that the government or the minister is the principal and that the 
enterprise is the agent is misleading … The state is not a person, not even a single 
organization. It acts through a variety of ministers legislators and civil servants who 
are themselves agents of the general public. These agents invariably see their 
mission as different from one another. Their goals are rarely, if ever, stated explicitly 
and the trade offs among them are not agreed. Thus different agents give the 
















The Role of Stakeholder Interactions in Crisis Development 
 
As is evident from chapter three, South Africa’s failure between 1998 and 2004 to adequately 
address the challenges of electricity pricing was sufficient enough to foreclose the option of 
attracting private participation into new electricity generation. Even if, in principle, the goal of 
attracting private participation had been unequivocally embraced. In fact, as this chapter will show, 
the unresolved policy ambiguities vis-à-vis private participation went way beyond issues of pricing. 
Ordinarily, in examining the design and implementation of new policies, the presumption is that the 
policy design is coherent, set by a single, well-defined principal, and then implemented more or less 
effectively. This can be greatly misleading. Whilst public organisations may have only one executive in 
theory, the state, in practice, “they are answerable to several different constituencies with different 
objectives (Dixit, 1997:378; Levy 2014: 138).  
An alternative proposition, laid out conceptually by Mushtaq Khan (2010) and Levy (2014) is that in 
some circumstances there can be multiple principles, with the eventual policy decisions an outcome 
of contestation between them. In such instances we see, “Goal formation as the outcome of 
interaction among a coalition that includes diverse factions of  government  each with its own 
distinct purposes  and also enterprise managers  who are likely to have goals  of their own ,” ( Levy, 
1987:77).   
This chapter thus complements the discussion of pricing in chapter three, by careful process tracing 
of the electricity policy discourse in additional, complementary areas: 
- Whether in principle stakeholders (and overall policy) were supportive of private 
participation in electricity generation; 
- What was the understanding of  the specific role of the private sector in electricity 
generation – privatise some existing capacity? Invest in some or all new capacity? Both? And 
if so,  governed by what institutional arrangements? 
 
As will be seen, notwithstanding a seemingly formal cabinet endorsement of private participation 
subsequent to the 1998 White Paper, policy on the question remained ambiguous and contested 
throughout the 1998-2004 period: mirroring a landscape of complex negotiations between 
competing agents as opposed to a clearly defined set of goals  provided by a singular principle to be 







4.1 Table of Stakeholder Actions and  Goals 
The table below provides an overview of each of the stakeholders and their actions with regards to 
the issue of obtaining private participation within the South African ESI. 
Stakeholders Position  vis-à-vis  Private 
Participation 
Key Actions 
Cabinet For, then Against 
Cabinet provided the two main 
decisions that determined the period. 
However whilst the first if these 
decisions was in favour of private 
participation the  second was a retreat 
and moved towards a reinstated 
government control over capacity 
development. 
• Approved the two major decisions that 
affected the South African ESI. 
• The decision to prevent Eskom from 
participating in new build projects in 2001. 
• Decision to transfer capacity development 








The department provided very clear 
policy to prepare Eskom for  a 
competitive ESI  through the Eskom 
Conversion Act, as well as the plans for 
the development of separate business 
units within the  organisation. 
• Provided a plan to split Eskom into  
separate business units; generation, 
transmission and distribution. 
• Presented plan for the corporatization of 
Eskom.  
• Provided plan for the sale of 30% of Eskom 
• In 2002 made statements that Eskom 
would remain energy supplier of first 
resort. 
• Announced Eskom would be champion of 






The department initially led the call for 
reform through the  White Paper and 
other public endorsements. However, 
it failed to provide the legislative 
environment that would enable 
private participation until well after 
the 2007/8 crisis.  
• Published the White Paper that began the 
reform process in the ESI. 
• Focused organisational attention on 
restructuring the distribution sector before 
addressing generation capacity issues. 
• Announced Eskom would face a 
competitive market by 2010. 
• Described the multi market model as the 
ideal goal for the SA ESI and was part of a 
work group to design said model.  
• Sent out tender bid for technical advisor to 
prepare IPP bids. 
• Stated that government must choose  






Throughout the period, the 
organisation strongly pushed for 
development of a competitive 
electricity market. 
• Hired  a Norwegian Company to help it 
develop a regulatory framework for a 
competitive market place. 
• The organisation strongly pushed for the 
development of an industry wide policy to 
introduce competition to the ESI. 
• Fought against the privatisation of Eskom 
until a competitive market had been 
developed. 
• Licensed two IPPs. 
• Proposed a National Power Pool within 
Eskom prior to the advance of national 
competition to prepare the sector. 
• Published the Multi-Market Model for a 
competitive SA ESI. 
• Prevented  Eskom from obtaining price 




The organisation complied with efforts 
to prepare it for a competitive market 
place. It continually raised doubts as to 
whether a competitive market was the 
ideal solution for the SA ESI. 
• Began to restructure the company in order 
to meet the goals of the White Paper. 
• Publically called into question the rationale 
of reform as Eskom was still the lowest 
cost electricity producer internationally. 
• Pushed for high price increases in order to 
fund  capital expansion. 
 
Labour Against 
Was strongly against private 
participation throughout the period.  
• Officially opposed to the policies proposed 
by the White Paper. 
• Broke off the National Framework 
Agreement because they felt it had been 
violated. 
• Cosatu staged protests outside parliament 
against the Eskom Conversion Bill and the 





Were a driving force in the 
development of the White Paper and 
continued to provide public support 
for reform measures through the 
process. 
• Offered public support for competition 
measures. 




Were willing to be involved in the 
generation capacity development over 
the period 
• Showed Interest in establishing offices in 
South Africa. 
• Applied for licenses.  
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Table 4 
4.2 -Process Tracing: 1998-2001 
Using the process tracing methodology outlined in the introductory chapter, this section aims to 
explore how the interconnectedness of energy relations created a climate for crisis. The narrative is 
based on newsprint articles available on the SA Media Database that contained the words electricity 
and crisis. The results of the search were then examined for topical  relevance and the relevant 
articles were used to create the following narrative of how pricing policy unfolded in South Africa 
over the period 1998-2004. 
4.2.1 Immediate Responses to the White Paper 
 Eskom officials displayed their support of paper as it provided a framework, “within which it could 
continue to do business,” (Chalmers, 1998:10). The organisation began to act on the Energy White 
Paper and prepare for the possibility of a more competitive electricity supply industry (ESI) through 
the Eskom Enterprises. Officially established in 1999 Eskom Enterprises was the arm of the business 
designed specifically to focus on Eskom’s non-regulated business nationally and to expand the reach 
of Eskom to the rest of Africa through work in energy and energy related services (Eskom, 1999).  
Minister of the Department of Minerals and Energy, Penuell Maduna stated that whilst the DME was 
pushing for a reform of the sector into separate generation, distribution and transmission companies, 
“This does not mean we will break Eskom up… the aim is to allow for broader participation in these 
sectors.” Short term plans included a restructuring of the distribution sector, the creation of a 
national electrification fund. The long term goals focused on a reform of the transmission and 
generation sectors whilst encouraging competition within the industry (Chalmers & Vermuelen, 
1998:1).  
Technocratic visionaries and analysts fully supported the new policy as they felt that, “The 
introduction  of competition into the electricity supply sector  along with restructuring, would help 
streamline the troubled market and could lead to greater efficiencies and further price reductions,” 
(Chalmers,  1998:10). 
In June 1999, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) general secretary, Gwede Mantashe, 
accused government of pursuing a privatisation agenda through the 1998 White Paper and the 
Eskom Amendment Act which they felt was pushed through by the Department of Public Enterprise. 
Mantashe critiqued the White Paper saying its plans for restructuring, “had been reduced to a 
political football and this needed to be urgently corrected,” and that the steps towards the 
separation of the distribution, transmission and generation were in preparation for, “the piecemeal 
privatisation of Eskom.” Something that labour was very opposed to (Chalmers, 1999c:3). 
In September 1999, the Director General of the DME, Sandile Nogxina, re-iterated that progress in 
the implementation of the White Paper would go forth in 1999 in the areas of, “increased access to 
affordable energy services, improving governance and stimulating economic development by 
encouraging competition and investor friendly practices.” However, “The most urgent initiative in the 
power sector is the restructuring of the R25bn distribution sector,” (Chalmers, 1999d:7). 
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During 1999, Eskom spent much of the year preparing for the onset of increased market competition 
by dividing its operations into regulated and non-regulated business. The organisation was seemingly 
in favour of the reform  and increased competition  in principal.  Their chairman, Reuel Khoza stated, 
“But it must be implemented in a systematic fashion so as not to prejudice the existing strengths of 
Eskom and the market,” (Chalmers, 1999e:5). 
 With the exception of labour, the immediate responses to the White Paper, seemed to be in support 
of reform.  
4.2.2 The Structure of Change  
In late 1999, the private sector began to raise concerns about the lack of legislative structure in the 
reform and privatisation process. William Mthembu, legal partner at Werksmans Attorneys stated 
that, “SA did not have legislation to regulate the conditions under which state owned enterprises 
such as Transnet, Eskom, Telkom and SA Post Office may be restructured and privatised.” Public 
Enterprises Minister, Jeff Radebe had previously announced that the department was working to 
provide a regulatory framework that would encourage stability and security in the reform processes 
(Chalmers, 1999f:6). 
In order to help it meet the regulatory challenges of reform in the distribution sector, NER signed a 
three year contract with the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate to help establish 
the pricing regulations for the changing electricity market. The group was also to help in, “capacity 
building, advice and consultation, and a project to examine the economic impact of various 
electricity market structure options,” (Chalmers, 1999g:5).  
The NER received many applications from a number of interested IPPs and committed to developing 
a regulatory framework that would allow IPP participation over the course of 2000 (Chalmers, 
1999h:4). 
In 1999, the Minister of the Department of Public Enterprises, Jeff Radebe presented new policy 
initiatives to restructure Eskom into, “three separate businesses - electricity distribution, 
transmission and generation.” The plan to divvy up the generation sector into separate business units 
with business accounts for each power station was the most controversial (Lunsche, 1999:4).  
In January 2000, the NUM announced that the “National Framework agreement was effectively 
'dead' because government was consistently failing to engage labour about its privatisation program 
at Eskom.” This was an agreement signed in 1996 between labour and government to facilitate the 
restructuring of state apparatus, ensuring that labour was always a part of the process.  NUM general 
secretary, Gwede Mantashe stated that, “All signals are there that the programme of privatising 
Eskom is being accelerated – but government continues to deny it”.   He called for a meeting of all 
primary stakeholders to discuss the issue further. There was a lot of unrest by labourers, at what 
seemed like the privatisation of Eskom. The NUM refused to act as a “buffer” between government 
and workers (Grawitzky, 2000:3). 
At the AIC sub-Saharan power conference in February 2000, the DME Minister, Phumzile Mlamb-
Ngcuka reiterated that whilst change was necessary across the generation, transmission and 
distribution sectors of the South African ESI, “the distribution side of the power sector was most 
urgently in need of reform. This was contrasted with a statement by the NER CEO,  Xolani Mkhwanazi 
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who said that, “ We need a policy decision on the overall  electricity  supply industry structure  which 
will fit in with the objectives of the (energy) white paper,” (Chalmers, 2000c:2).  
Though the DME, NER and DPE were all interested in providing a structural framework in which the 
policy could be carried out, there seemed to be a lack of communication in what that structure would 
be. As a result of this lack of cohesion between the three parties, months passed with no progression 
towards establishing credible rules for attracting IPPs into electricity generation. Labour was 
completely against the perceived move towards privatisation and frustrated the process. 
4.2.3. Privatisation versus Market Competition 
In February 2000, Eskom selected a new CEO, Thulani Gcbashe, former head of Eskom Enterprises, 
Eskom’s non-regulated business sector. His stance on the reform of the ESI was as follows: “The 
government’s  energy White Paper has cleared the path for the establishment of independent power 
producers in SA, but competition will not develop as long as the country has surplus capacity,” 
(Gordon, 2000:5). 
Later in the same month, NER chairman Enos Banda made a report to Parliament’s Minerals and 
Energy Committee in order to dissuade government from selling any stakes in Eskom until the 
organisation had been restructured, as that would merely entrench the monopoly within the South 
African ESI. Instead the organisation proposed a model whereby, “a holding company would be 
created under which would fall four or five subsidiaries housing Eskom’s independent generation 
entities which could be sold.” Banda put forward the regulators views for a wholesale and retail 
market for electricity in the future (Ensor, 2000:5).  
In April 2000, the World Bank sponsored a seminar in South Africa. The seminar featured 
international experts with reform experience in their own countries.  No single ideology was pursued 
at the meeting, however, competition was strongly advocated as a way of going forward. The 
Minister of Minerals and Energy, Pumzile Mlambo-Ncguka expressed the following as the 
government’s main objectives for reform: “(i) increase economic efficiency and operation costs so 
that  costs and prices are as low as possible; (ii) maximise financial and economic returns to 
government from ESI ; (iii) increase the opportunity for black economic empowerment ; and (iv) to 
protect public benefits such as widened access to the poor, energy efficiency ongoing R&D and 
environmental sustainability,” (Eberhard, 2005:5314,5315). After the workshop senior leaders from 
the various agencies including Eskom and the NER decided to draft a paper on the restructuring of 
the ESI. One of the main recommendations that arose from the conference was that Eskom reduce 
its share of generation capacity to 35% (Eberhard, 2005:5315). 
In their 1999/2000 Annual Report, the NER announced that it would not grant licenses with inflexible 
pricing schedules. The NER was clear that it, “will not license additional generation capacity that is 
based on inflexible long-term power purchase agreements. This stance is based on the premise that 
customers should be protected against being deprived of the  benefits of a future competitive 
electricity market,”( NER in PARI, 2013:13).  
In September 2000, a bill was put forward for the corporatisation of Eskom by the Department of 
Public Enterprises with a plan for it to be implemented/become operational by January 2001. 
Director General of the Department of Public Enterprises, Andile Nkhulu went on to stress that the 
bill had, “Nothing to do with privatisation,” (Ensor, 2000:4).  
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In October 2000, Sivi Gounden, Director General of the DPE announced that the government had 
plans to sell off 30% of Eskom’s generation capacity to multinational players, opening up the market 
for competition and potentially raising more than R30bn to government coffers (IC Publications, 
2000). 
Surprised by the move in policy away from creating a competitive model to selling assets, COSATU 
finance and fiscal co-ordinator, Neva Makgetla stated that the new policy, “Could make it difficult to 
implement the ANC’s promise to provide a minimum of free basic services to all households,” (Louw, 
2000: 6). 
During this period, Eskom  began to raise its objections to any kind of reform process. Both the DME 
and the DPE agreed that reform was necessary;  however, they disagreed on its implementation. The 
NER pushed for gradual reform from within the organisation, leading to increased competition. The 
DPE purported to be against privatisation but created a policy that pushed for increased privatisation. 
Labour continued to express its dissatisfaction with the trajectory of ESI reform. As a result of this lack 
of cohesion between the three parties, months passed with no forward movement in establishing 
credible rules for attracting IPPs into electricity generation.  
4.2.4 The IPPS Get Involved 
In their 1999/2000 Annual Report, the NER mentioned having entered into talks with various IPPs to 
discuss future investment options (PARI, 2013:13).  It was expected that the first licenses for new IPPs 
would be granted by 2001. Xolani Mkhwanazi, then CEO of NER said that, “The regulator’s vision for 
the electricity market in the medium term was to establish an internal power pool for electricity 
trading fed by imported electricity and independent producers,”… “The vision in the longer term was 
the creation of a power exchange, fed by Eskom’s competing generating companies, imports and 
independent power producers. The state owned transmission company would be independent and 
feed power through to the regional electricity distributors,” (Chalmers, 2000d:4).  
In December 2000, the first IPP license was granted to Biomass Energy Ventures to operate a 17.5 
MW station outside of Durban by NER. The regulator was also on talks to grant the license for a joint 
venture between the Johannesburg Metropolitan Council and American Company AES to refurbish 
the Kelvin power station outside of the city (Marrs, 2000:1).  
By April 2001, Eskom had significantly altered its generation division , grouping its power stations 
into five separate competing entities in order to help better prepare for future market competition. 
There was some dissent within the organisation as to why competition was being introduced into the 
South African ESI and Eskom. CEO, Thulani Gcbashe, was noted as saying, “ Eskom has the lowest 
electricity price in the world, and excellent technical performance when benchmarked  against the 
rest of the world. We need clear objectives as to why we are going this route,” (Chalmers, 2001c:17). 
In 2001  in response to what seemed like a favourable investment climate, many international power 
producing firms began to set up shop in South Africa. Some of the companies that had created  South 
African offices or set up enquiries to do so were: ; International Power, Cinergy Corp, AES, EDF, 
Tractebel, Enron and Shell (Chalmers, 2001d:15). The Minerals and Energy Minister, Pumzile 
Mlambo-Ngcuka announced that Eskom would face a fully competitive market by 2010 and the 
Minister of Public Enterprise, Jeff Radebe announced that he would shortly be presenting the model 
for a competitive electricity market (Chalmers, 2001d:15).  
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In May 2001, the deputy minister for the Department of Minerals and Energy announced at a 
privatisation conference that the main drivers for reform within the South African ESI were to meet, 
“social, development and economic objectives.”  These objectives would include, black economic 
empowerment, higher returns for the state, greater economic efficiencies and more private 
participation. “In light of this, it is clear the introduction independent power producers to the SA 
market will be facilitated,” stated Shabangu at the conference. The department faced the difficult 
decision of how to phase in private participation without entrenching the monopoly provided by 
Eskom, or creating a new market with more asymmetries. As such the official departmental line was 
the following, “We believe that competition should be introduced systematically, in a phased manner 
so as not to prejudice the existing strengths of the electricity supply industry,”  (Chalmers, 2001e:2).  
In spite of a level cohesion between the parties, months passed with no forward movement in 
establishing credible rules for attracting IPPs into electricity generation. All parties agreed with idea 
of increased completion, however, all of the parties chose to do so in their own way. 
Later in May, cabinet approved a proposal that prevented Eskom from participating in new capacity 
development, changing the scene of the South African ESI.  This came through a policy of “managed 
liberalisation” of South Africa’s ESI.   Some of the main policy elements were as follows: 
 “ Eskom retains no more than 70% of existing generation capacity; 
 A private sector participation in the electricity generation market of up to 70% of the existing 
generation capacity;  
 Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) of about 10% of the generating capacity to be achieved 
by no later than 2003; 
 In order to ensure meaningful participation of the private sector in the electricity in the 
medium term, Eskom will not be allowed to invest in new generation capacity in the 
domestic market,” (Belinska, 2003:89,90).  
The proposal also set a clearer definition of the NER as, “the independent regulator of the ESI, 
development of a new licensing  framework, adaptation of price setting arrangements  and 
establishment of performance monitoring  to ensure the security of supply,” ( Belinska, 2003:90).  
4.3  Process Tracing: 2001-2004 
4.3.1 The Response after No Build  
In June 2001, COSATU, staged a picket outside the parliament buildings in order to protest against 
the Eskom Conversion Bill that was under debate. The organisation called for a repeal of the Eskom 
Amendment Act or for the Bill to be delayed so as to further political discussion. The organisation felt 
that, “The corporatisation of Eskom would undermine its role in providing affordable electrification 
and would open the way to privatisation,” (Ensor, 2001:2).  
In July 2001, Minister of the Department of Minerals and Energy, Pumzila Mlambo-Ngcuka  said, that 
Eskom would “retain its  dominant position  in power generation. We are not desperate to raise 
money . Our priority  is to look at the role electricity can play in poverty alleviation  and ensure that 
we can contain upward pressure on prices,” (Chalmers, 2001f:1). Private sector participation was to 
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be limited to 30% and the department’s main priority was to promote BEE companies within the 
market. There were future plans to create suitable IPP regulation and to allow the private sector 
purchase equity in Eskom. Though there were no finalized plans on what a revamped South African 
ESI would look like the goal was that, “Over time, a multimarket model (made up of) electricity  
generators, traders and power purchasers may take place on a variety of platforms including bilateral 
deals, future markets and day ahead markets,” (Chalmers, 2001f:1).  
The private sector made it very clear however, that the long lead times for plant development meant 
that licenses had to be issued within a short time frame as, “ Nobody in their right minds is going to 
invest billions of rands in a power station and then ask if they can have a license to run it. I don’t 
think there has been any change in the government’s licensing of IPPs,” said Peter Leaver, Cape 
Power Project Manager (Marrs, 2001:2). 
In August 2001, the Eskom Conversion Act transformed Eskom into a company and legal taxpayer, 
governed under the Public Finance Management Act of 1999 and the Companies Act of 1973 (Eskom, 
2001). 
In October, Eskom brought together various key stakeholders from the Department of Minerals and 
Energy, the Department of Public Enterprises, the South African Local Government Association 
(SALGA) and the NER, at the Farm Inn summits. The purpose of the summit was for Eskom to express 
its concern at the way in which industry reform was transpiring (Eberhard, 2005:5315; PARI, 
2013:12). 
By the end of October, the NER had licensed two IPPs, a small 17.5 MW station in Durban and  the 
much larger Kelvin Station in Gauteng (Chalmers, 2001g:3).  Government officials also confirmed that 
30% of Eskom’s equity would be sold to private investors by 2006 (Wray,2001:2).  
In light of the dissatisfaction displayed by labour on the way in which ESI reform was turning out, the 
DME  tried to respond to those needs with the assurances that government remained pro-poor and 
that privatisation was not the cards. IPPs responded favourably to the change but needed a solid 
framework in which to understand their role in reform. The NER took the ban seriously and began to 
expand its licensing.  In spite of the predominantly positive response to the change, there was no 
forward movement in establishing credible rules for attracting IPPs into electricity generation. 
4.3.2 The Possible Structure of a Reformed ESI 
In October 2001, Eskom aiming to maintain its dominant position in the ESI, proposed a plan to 
introduce competition without privatisation, by allowing BEE partners to operate some of its 
mothballed stations, making up 10% of capacity. This would be supplemented by bringing in private 
actors in the medium term to provide 20% of capacity. Plans to restructure Eskom faced very serious 
opposition from groups such as Labour who felt that as the lowest cost electricity provider world-
wide, Eskom was run in a highly efficient manner (Chalmers, 2001g:3). Economic analysts noted that 
regardless of the way in which the new ESI was structured, electricity prices were set to dramatically 
increase as the surplus that had kept prices artificially low would soon run out. It was also expressed 
that mothballed power stations proved a bad investment choice for BEE firms as  they had 
“substantially higher risks than other generating assets,” (Chalmers, 2001h: 4). The absence on clear 
policy guidelines for the restructuring of ESI meant that policy was very fluid and susceptible for 
capture by parties with vested interests (Business Day, 2001: 9). 
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In December 2001, as a means to help increase investor confidence, the NER proposed a national 
power pool as the first step towards increasing competition in the sector. The NER CEO, Xolani 
Mkhwanazi stated that, “No (private) equity  partner  would be keen to bid for equity in the power 
stations without a level of competition,” (Chalmers, 2001i:2).  
In January 2002, the NER pushed for a three phase restructuring policy. This policy would build on 
the initial step of Eskom being established as an independent company through the Eskom 
Conversion Act, to the separation of  the transmission, distribution and  generation sectors. This 
would culminate in IPPs being allowed into the market by 2004 either through the purchase of some 
of Eskom’s generation assets or through the development of new capacity build programs (Chalmers, 
2002a:1). 
In  early 2002, the Minister of Public Enterprises, Jeff Radebe announced a plan for Eskom’s reform 
that mirrored Eskom’s  October 2001 proposal of a 10% asset dispersal to BEE partners and  the aim 
of a 20% stake to a foreign equity partner by 2003 (Thompson, 2002:15). He stated, “We are clearly 
committed to introducing competition  into the domestic market.” At the time, no finalized 
regulation of what a competitive South African market would look like. The NER, however, was in the 
process of developing a framework to introduce competition (Chalmers, 2002b:21). 
The postponement of the licensing deal with a second national phone operator, sent out signals to 
investors that the introduction of competition into the ESI would not be as smooth a process as 
initially intended. The Enron scandal in the US also undermined global confidence in investing in 
utilities. There was in addition the idea from some sectors that, “the government should not try to fix 
something that is not broken,” (Chalmers, 2002c:11). 
The first National Integrated Resource Plan (NIRP 1) was published by NER in March 2002 (PARI, 
2013:13,14). In the early 2000s, discussions for Mmamabula Energy Project began between 
Botswana and South Africa (PARI, 2013:14).  
In mid-March 2002, the participants of the Farm Inn Summits reached a broad consensus on the ESI 
restructuring initiative. An ESI restructuring committee chaired by the DPE would be formed. Eskom 
would establish internal competition by ring-fencing its stations into clusters/portfolios. Eskom 
holdings would establish subsidiary companies for Eskom Generation and Transmission (Eskom later 
contested this claim) (Eberhard, 2005:5315). 
On the 1 July 2002, Eskom was officially converted into a tax paying public company. The minister of 
Public Enterprises said that the conversion was to help Eskom deal with the challenges of being 
involved in a competitive market place. He also stated the following: “Let me assure you that Eskom 
despite the conversion into being a public company, will remain the energy supplier of first resort, 
hence the need to ensure  its continued existence,” ( Chalmers, 2002c:12). 
The Department of Minerals and Energy, along with Department of Public Enterprises and other 
relevant stakeholders came together to form the Multi-Market Model Workgroup. Formed in 
November 2002, the group sought to create a, “detailed functional market description, transitional 
plan and governance arrangements for the proposed multi-market model for electricity supply 
industry in South Africa,” (du Toit, 2003:44). 
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Each principal provided their own  interpretation of the  structure they preferred for a reformed ESI. In 
some cases, such as with the DPE, there were conflicting goals within the organisation itself. This lack 
of cohesion between principals meant that there was no advancement in establishing credible rules 
for attracting IPPs into electricity generation. 
4.3.3 The Push for Eskom 
In 2003, Eskom’s non-regulated wing, Eskom Enterprises was reported as having financial troubles 
and in need of a substantial cash injection (Ensor,2003:1). In July of 2003, Eskom  provided a public 
warning of the impending electricity crisis and the need to begin building new power stations 
(Phasiwe, 2003e:2).  Major blackouts in the United States added to an atmosphere of urgency and 
Eskom began to upgrade its transmission grids and look to alternative energy sources such as wind, 
solar and nuclear (Phasiwe, 2003f:2). This resulted in R50bn investment project in the refurbishment 
of  power stations and the recommissioning of mothballed plants. Later that month, Eskom applied 
for an 8.5% increase in prices in order to better facilitate capacity development. The NER  only 
approved a 2.5% increase, stating, “Eskom has the capacity to build new plants without increasing 
real prices now,” and expressing the belief that, “There is no guarantee; Eskom will be required to 
build new generation capacity,” (Phasiwe,2003b:3). 
Also in July of 2003, the  Multi-Market Model Group completed their report and a paper was 
published in the NER Quarterly Journal of  an ideal market structure for the South  African ESO  (du 
Toit, 2003:44).  
Eskom expressed the need for peaking capacity. Diesel powered open cycle gas turbines (OCGT) were 
suggested with a plan for four plants,  to be built by Eskom and two to be built by IPPs (PARI, 
2013:15).  The IPP procurement plans for peaking power were received for Cabinet approval in 
December   (PARI, 2013:15). 
In January 2004, Eskom lodged an appeal with the Department of Minerals and Energy in order to 
challenge the 2.5% increase granted by the NER. Eskom appealed about the increase on the basis 
that it would need to strengthen its capacity . The  NER responded that, “Customers should not be 
made to contribute to  the future costs of a future power station,” (Phasiwe, 2004:2). 
As Eskom’s non-regulated interests seemed to suffer, the organisation raised the alarm at the 
impending crisis. The NER as an organisation very committed to the ideal of a competitive ESI, pushed 
very hard against the idea that Eskom would be building new capacity. The lack of an official clarity 
on the desired objective of reform meant that there was no development towards in establishing 
credible rules for attracting IPPs into electricity generation. 
4.3.4 The Final Stretch 
In February 2004, the DME issued a request for proposals for a legal and technical adviser to help 
with the bidding process for IPP tenders (PARI,2013:15). This bid was to find someone to co-ordinate 
the technical and legal tender documents. It was the department’s first definite step towards the 
development of a competitive market since the publication  of the White Paper nearly six years 
earlier (Phasiwe, 2004:1). Many private investors raised concerns about the tight deadlines given to 
build new power plants as the  final candidate would only be confirmed in July 2005 and capacity 
was expected to run out by 2007 (Phasiwe, 2004:1). 
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In April 2004, Eskom Enterprises went on to experience great losses due to the failure of licensing 
agreement to materialise  South Africa’s second telecommunications operator and was expected to 
write off R803 million against its investments in Lesotho and South Africa (Phasiwe, 2004:3).  
 In the same month, Eskom went against official government policy and began preparing models for 
new capacity development and the then CEO Thulani Gcabashe, said that they, “would hand over the 
reins to independent power producers should government say so.” It was noted that “Government 
has said that Eskom as the 'supplier of last resort' could be asked to build new capacity should the 
need arise,” (Phasiwe, 2004:1). 
In May, the national government upheld the NER’s decision to allow a 2.5% tariff increase,  
maintaining  previous statements that new capacity was to be built by private companies . Industry 
analysts warned that such a low increase could deter private investment (Phasiwe, 2004:2). Towards 
the end of the month, President Thabo Mbeki announced that a tender for generation capacity 
would be launched in December 2004 and that the winning bid would have been announced by the 
end of the first half of 2005 (Phasiwe,2004:4). 
In the run up to the general election in  April 2004,  ANC national policy shifted towards, “poverty 
eradication.” Focusing on, “parastatal investment rather than big asset sales,” (Chalmers, 2004:13).  
By July 2004, plans to sell 30% of Eskom’s share had been temporarily shelved. Government had 
made clear the intention to launch a tender for 600-1000MW. What was unclear at the time was 
whether or not Eskom would be allowed to participate in the bid process; the Department of 
Minerals and Energy did little to clarify the situation. During her yearly budget speech, Energy 
Minister, Phumzile Mlambo-Ncgaka announced that  “the state has to put security above all, and 
above competition especially,” (Thompson, 2004: 11). 
In August 2004, Eskom CEO, Thulani Gcbashe, asked for clarity on the Department of Minerals and 
Energy’s electricity generation policy. The department had committed to involving IPPs in the 
capacity development process. It lacked any clear policy on how that would occur and the long lead 
times in power plant development meant that investment decisions needed to be made in a short 
time frame if there was to be a chance of avoiding blackouts. Gcbashe stated, “We cannot allow a 
lack of clarity to impede development so that there is a lack of capacity when we need it...we need to 
make investment decisions.” Government had been planning the development of three power 
stations by 2010,  with  foreign direct investment of R15bn. There was no clarity as to who was going 
to build those stations (Ensor,2004: 2). 
In October 2004, the Minister of Public Enterprises, Alec Erwin announced that  as  the result of a 









The initial research for the thesis was based on the premise, that during the 2007/8 Electricity Crisis, 
something had gone wrong in the South African ESI, and Eskom’s perceived managerial 
incompetence was to blame. The first forays into investigation showed that whilst Eskom was heavily 
involved in the development of the crisis and its resultant aftermath,
2
 the organisation was not 
involved in the ways that were typically portrayed by the media. This turn of events led to the 
development and exploration of two equifinal hypotheses, H2 and H3 using the research tools of the 
analytic narrative and process tracing. 
  
The paper first explored H3: the lack of investment in new generation capacity and the subsequent 
energy crisis were the direct result of the implementation of policies that lacked internal consistency 
and whose implementation required technical & administrative capabilities beyond those which were 
available in practice 
 
Hypothesis 3 provided a seemingly more technical explanation for the crisis and placed the situation 
within the realm of technocratic inefficiency and stalling. This was manifest in the inability to 
determine a clear pricing policy which led to a crisis. The process tracing identified the lack of 
internal consistency as well as some of the difficulties faced by those tasked with policy 
implementation. One of the clearest aspects of the failure to develop the pricing policy necessary for 
a large scale sector reform, was the failure to develop consensus amongst the  key players involved in 
the ESI. Throughout the period under investigation, there were competing camps with competing 
ideologies regarding what kind of pricing policy was necessary. Given the time constraints and long 
lead times in electricity plant development, the lack of consensus in pricing policy proved disastrous 
and that alone could have accounted for the lack of sufficient investment in generation capacity by 
2007/8. 
 
A second hypothesis existed that was equally as probable as H3  though it  lay firmly in  the realm of 
political economy and the relations between various stakeholders.  
 
H2: The lack of investment in new generation capacity and the subsequent energy crisis were the 
direct result of having competing stakeholders with multiple objectives and no clear political 
champion of the highly complex  agenda set out in the  1998 White Paper on Energy. 
 
Through the investigation of H2, it was found that  whilst the initial presentation of the  1998 White 
Paper on Energy proffered little resistance. As time passed many of the stakeholders’ own goals and 
objectives clashed  with regards to what the future of the South African ESI should look like. For the 
most part there was consensus that reform in the South African ESI  was necessary. The nature of 
that reform was a highly contested issue with each faction pushing for their own  version to be 
adopted. This all occurred within a the complex web of interconnectedness where  various 
stakeholders held various levels of control as to how the reform process would  be carried out. In the 
limited time frame provided for change, the lack of a clear political champion meant that none of the 
reform ideologies came to pass in a cohesive manner. 
 
Independently, each of the two hypotheses could adequately explain the crisis, as two discrete paths 
leading to the same end point, establishing a firm sense of equifinality. An alternative and more 
probable outcome lies in the notion that these two hypotheses were mutually reinforcing. 
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It is theoretically possible that in the absence of multiple stakeholders with vested interests, a clear 
pricing policy that established the way for  IPPs to credibly invest in new generation capacity would 
have been developed. This is because, the technocratic weaknesses that allowed for initial policy 
ambiguity would have  been overcome through adaptation over time.  
 
It is also plausible that in the presence of a clearly designed pricing policy, the multiplicity of 
stakeholders would have had less of an  impact in derailing the process  of obtaining new investment. 
As there would have been a clear process to follow that would have allowed for the development of 
a clear overall IPP policy. 
 
This thesis was begun with the explicit intention of discovering the main cause of the 2007/8 
Electricity Crisis in South Africa. The initial scene, looked something akin to a murder mystery  with  
bogeymen hiding in  corners and evil intentions abounding. This research has found, that there were 
no bogeymen in corners  and no Machiavellian schemes of destruction. Rather, the cause of the 
2007/8 crisis was found to  lie in the far more simple and less  grand  adage that, “ Too many cooks 
spoil the broth.” 
 
In 1998, South Africa was a hub of reform, with new policies being developed in a number of sectors 
to redress some of the challenges caused by the apartheid government. South Africa was in a 
position where it could afford to consider policy reform as it had excess capacity  and a well-
functioning ESI. The international ESI had also gone through a period of reform. Whilst  no one policy 
model had gained dominance, it was  clear from international trends that reform was  a necessary 
step for any national ESI planning to  move into the 21st Century. It was in this light that a highly 
ambitious White Paper on Energy was presented in 1998. 
 
The paper pushed for significant reforms in the generation sector but failed to outline what exactly 
those reforms would look like. This left the process of clarification to the factions of government 
responsible for dealing with the ESI. What the policy failed to take into account, was the sheer 
number of stakeholders with vested interests in how the ESI should be run and the distinct lack of 
consensus between those stakeholders. This lack of consensus was aggravated by the time pressured 
nature of plant development. A ticking time bomb that meant that there was not enough time for an 
organic consensus to occur. 
 
In 2007/8, South Africa faced its most intensive electricity crisis to date, where total generation was 
operating at 75% of capacity and the country was plagued by rolling blackouts. It would be 
convenient if this crisis could be blamed on a single actor who failed to perform in their role in the 
ESI. Through for example, the failure to deliver coal or, a missing screw in a nuclear power plant. The 
research showed that the reasons for the crisis were far more complex and that at its heart, the crisis 
was formed through the complexity of power relations at the interface between politics and 
administration, where unresolved political conflicts played out within the public service.  
 
As complex power relations are at the heart of many political systems, this reasoning can lead one to 
despair and conclude that, there is nothing to be done and that a crisis was almost inevitable given 
the underlying complexities of the South African ESI. However, that is not necessarily the case and a 
possible alternative scenario could have involved more moderate goals in the espousing of the 1998 
White Paper, the initial document pushing for reform of the sector. The 1998 White Paper was a 
revolutionary document brought to light in a time when there were many sectors in need of reform 
in South Africa. At the time, Eskom maintained a functional monopoly over the ESI and had found 
ways to deliver power cheaply. Whilst this did not mean that Eskom was operating at optimal 
efficiency, it did mean that those with the political clout to push through major reform did not see 
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the reason to do so until it was too late.  A more modest reforming strategy could potentially have 
allowed the government to make use of the skills and expertise present in Eskom whilst pushing for a 
gradual more long term reform.  However, such proclamations can only be made with the gift of 
hindsight. 
 
At the time of writing South Africa had yet to complete any of the major power plants proposed to 
help ease supply constraints and it is hoped that this work will help to contribute to the development 











































Appendix 1- Timeline of Events 1994-2011 
 
1994 ANC Government comes into power (Eberhard, 2003:12). 
1995 National Energy Regulator (NER) formed with mostly former Eskom employees (Eberhard, 
2003:24, 25). 
1997 New influx of staff at the NER as many of the original staff had left (Eberhard, 2003:25). 
1998 The White Paper is published. 
1999 The NER in talks with various IPPs to discuss future investment options (PARI, 2013:13). 
2000 In the 1999/2000 NER Annual Report, the organisation announced that they would not grant 
licenses with inflexible pricing schedules (PARI, 2013:13).  
World Bank Hosts workshop in order to help establish goals for the reform of the SA ESI and it 
was suggested that Eskom reduce its generation market share to 35% (Eberhard, 2003:37).  
DPE publishes a new policy framework for the restructuring of SOEs including Eskom (PARI, 
2013:10). 
2001 Eskom Conversion Act is Passed and Eskom is converted into a legal company (EGI-SA, 2010; 
PARI, 2013). 
 A new NER Board is established( Eberhard, 2003:25). 
Cabinet announces that Eskom will retain 70% of their current market share with the aim of 
achieving 10% BEE market share by 2004 (PARI: 2013, 13; Eberhard, 2003:37). 
Cabinet decision prevents Eskom from investing in new generation capacity within South Africa 
(Newbery & Eberhard, 2008:58; Belinska, 2003:90).  
The first Farm Inn Summits take place (PARI,2013:12). 
Early 2000s: Discussions for Mmamabula begin between South African and Botswana 
governments (PARI,2013:14). 
2002 National Integrated Resource Plan 1 (NIRP) is published by NER (PARI, 2013:13,14). 
NER Multi-Market Model Group is formed (du Toit,2003:43,44). 
Signing forms at the Farm Inn summit (PARI,2013:12). 
2003 Eskom expresses the need for peaking capacity, diesel powered open cycle gas turbines (OCGT) 
are suggested with a plan for four plants, two built by Eskom and two by IPPs ( PARI,2013:15). 
Eskom begins detailed planning of new power stations due to perceived delays (PARI,2013:). 
Multi-Market Model Group complete their report in July and a paper is published in the NER 
Quarterly Journal (du Toit,2003:44). 
September  2003 Cabinet meeting decides that Eskom should be instructed to ensure security 
of supply until 2007, including building new power stations. With a caveat that 70% of new 
capacity post 2008 would be commissioned by Eskom with 30% commissioned from IPPs 
(Sonjica, 2008:3,4). 
IPP procurement plans for peaking power get Cabinet approval in December   (PARI, 2013:15). 
2004 DME issue a request for proposals for legal and technical advisers to help with the bidding 
process for IPPs in February (PARI, 2013:15). 
Decision for IPP investment is reversed by Cabinet (EGI-SA, 2010): 
Cabinet approved a five year investment for infrastructure development governing generation, 
transmission and distribution to the cost of R93 billion with R84 billion allocated to Eskom and 
the remainder to IPPs (PARI,2013:17). 
A follow up of the Farm Inn Summit (PARI, 2013:12). 
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Eskom CEO Thulani Gcbashe announces the possibility of a future crisis as generation capacity 
approaches its limits in August (PARI,2013:15). 
NIRP 2 Published by NER (PARI,2013:14). 
2005 RED 1 Formed in the Western Cape  
Intergovernmental Memorandum of Understanding signed for Mmamabula (PARI, 2013:14). 
Five potential OGCT IPPs shortlisted in bidding process (PARI, 2013:15). 
Eskom had already completed environmental assessments for its own OCGT plants (PARI, 
2013:15). 
Eskom approves investment decision for Project Alpha (later to be renamed Medupi) (Eskom, 
2013). 
Two investors submitted full proposals for the peaking power, AES  Consortium and Suez –
Inkanyezi ( PARI, 2013:14). 
Veld Fires in the Western Cape damage transmission lines along with a breakdown at Koeberg 
Nuclear station leads to rolling blackouts in the Northern and Western Capes (PARI, 2013:16) 
2006 Western Cape Electricity Crisis (EGI-SA, 2010). 
Request for Proposals for IPP Peaking power issued by the DME in April (DME, 2008).  
NER is absorbed into the National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA) in July (PARI, 
2013:16). 
The Energy Regulation Act is passed establishing NERSA’s legal mandate (PARI,2013:16). 
Eskom Annual Report announced board approval for a R150 billion investment up to 2011/12 
(PARI, 2013:17). 
2007   AES selected as the preferred bidder in IPP peaking power process in September (PARI: 2013, 
14). 
DME Annual report states that measures are in place for the development of a robust, 
integrated energy plan (PARI, 2013:16). 
AES received approval from the DME for an extension to complete their project agreements in 
November (PARI, 2013:14). 
World Bank Report on the South African ESI estimated if the economy grew at a rate of 6% a 
year it would need $5billion (estimated at R42 billion) in new infrastructure between 2005 & 
2010 (PARI, 2013:17). 
2008  Major Electricity Crisis. 
AES deal collapses in March (PARI, 2013:15). 
NIRP 3 Published by NER (PARI, 2013:14). 
2009 CIC a Canadian company operating Mmamabula present a formal bid for the project (PARI, 
2013:14). 
Eskom refuses to make a commitment towards Mmamabula in July and there were reports of 
Eskom shutting down IPP discussions (PARI, 2013:14). 
By the end of 2009 the cost of the capacity build programme had reached R395 billion (PARI, 
2013:17). 
2010 Eskom formally rejects Mmamabula offer (PARI, 2013:14). 
The World Bank announces funding to Eskom for the development of a new coal powered 
station in April (PARI, 2013:14). 
Integrated Resource Planning reverted to DME and first IRP published (PARI, 2013:14). 
2011 Electricity Regulation for New Generation Capacity and guidelines for an IPP bid programme 
gazetted in May (DME, 2011). 
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 Appendix 2  What Happened to the IPPs, 2004-2008? 
Post 2004 and the decision to reinstate Eskom’s role as the as the  major provider of electricity, there 
were some significant incidences with various consequences. This appendix will look at the role of 
IPPs during the period, 2004-2010.  
 
There are two main modes of investment for generation plants,   baseload plants and peaking plants.  
baseload plants are generally operational all year round creating a steady stream of power with 
minor variations. These plants are powered by different fuels internationally such as nuclear, coal and 
lignite. Baseload plants have, “the lowest marginal costs of production” and are known as, “high 
merit,” (Harris, 2006:29).  Peaking plants serve a different function from baseload plants and are 
meant to provide capacity to meet spikes in demand, at certain times of the day during certain 
seasons. They perform a reserve function of energy to be used during exceptional times creating 
more flexible energy access (Harris, 2006:30).  The complexity of electrical systems, the lack of 
economically efficient storage facilities and the constant need for demand and supply balance means 
that there needs to be a mix of both Base load and peaking load plants in a system to ensure optimal 
performance (Harris, 2006:30).  
 
South Africa experienced an interesting history in terms of the way it handled both baseload and 
peaking IPPs.   After the White Paper, the first official attempts at establishing the role of IPPs in the 
development of new capacity came from a 2001 World Bank sponsored Ministerial Workshop on 
Electricity Supply Industry Reform and it was proposed that Eskom reduced their generation market 
share to 35% to help liberalise the ESI (Eberhard, 2005:5315).  Through vigorous lobbying from 
Eskom executives, Cabinet approved a  final proposal whereby Eskom would  maintain 70% of the 
existing electricity market selling the remaining 30% to the private sector and a 10% minimum to 
Black Economic Empowerment beneficiaries (Eberhard, 2005:5315; PARI, 2013:13).  This act was 
reinforced by a cabinet decision to prevent Eskom from entering in new capacity build projects in an 
attempt to encourage private investment (Newbery & Eberhard, 2008:58). 
 
The  mix of private and public  investment was theoretically pursued until  2004 when the then 
Minister of Public Enterprises, Alec Erwin announced Cabinet’s authorisation of Eskom to participate 
in new capacity build projects with the restriction that at least 30% of new capacity created should 
be handled by the private sector (Newbery & Eberhard, 2008:58). This was reinforced by a 2007 
Cabinet decision to move against the 2003 Multi Market Model proposed by the Multi Market Model 
Group to a single buyer model where Eskom would act as the sole purchaser of power from IPPs, 
“responsible for ensuring that adequate generation capacity would be made available and that 30% 
of the new power generation capacity would be derived from IPPs,” (DME, 2007: 55). This decision 
was made as a means to pursue security of supply over reform concerns (DME, 2007:55). 
 
In practice, very little was done to engage IPP investment during the first of wave of investment 
seeking between 2001 and 2004 when the  all new capacity was to be derived from IPPs. Whilst 
there was greater movement towards IPP investment in the second phase from 2004 onwards when 
the ideal mix of public to private investment in new capacity was  70% to 30%, the system lacked a 
coherent narrative on how that would be achieved, and the  following examples of  interaction for 
both Baseload and Peaking IPPs  will explore that . 
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Mmamabula – A Baseload IPP 
The Mmamabula Energy Project was a Botswana based deal managed by Canadian company, CIC –
Energy. The project was based on the development of a 1320 MW coal fired plant to be built in 
Mmamabula, a large coal field, west of the South African border (Wheeler, 2008: 3; PARI, 2013:14). 
This project aimed to increase Botswana’s level of electrical self-sustainability. The large nature of the 
plant meant that the project needed a means to economically utilise the excess capacity that would 
be generated. 
 
By 2005 talks between South Africa had a reached a level that the president of Botswana announced 
the deal to his cabinet and intergovernmental memorandum of understanding had been signed 
(PARI, 2013: 14).  Kumba  Coal (Pty) Ltd had been contracted to perform a pre-feasibility study in the 
development of a Mmamabula Central coal resource  in 2006  and talks had been had over the 
possibility of obtaining World  Bank  funding for the project  by 2008 (Wheeler, 2008:4; Exxaro, 
2006). In 2009 CIC submitted formal bids to Eskom to supply power to the South African grid by 
2013.  Acceptance of the bid was postponed by Eskom on the grounds of a, “lack of clarity on its 
funding model. “ Eskom announced that the price of electricity proposed by CIC was higher than the 
NER regulated prices. During that time, Eskom suspended discussions with an estimated 30 other IPP 
bidders until it could establish clarity on the pricing regulations. In 2010 Eskom announced its 
unwillingness to enter into an agreement with CIC due to the absence of provisions for externally 
purchased coal power in the 2010 IRP (PARI, 2013:14).  
 
Interestingly enough in 2005, Eskom had already made the decision to begin developing its own level 
of baseload capacity through a project known as Project Alpha. This project would later be known as 
Medupi, the coal fired base load capacity that was awarded a $3 billion loan from the World Bank in 
2010 (PARI, 2013; Eskom, 2013:1). The site for Medupi was purchased from Kumba Coal (Pty) Ltd 
(now Exxaro (Pty) Ltd) and aims to provide a total capacity of 4800MW of electricity. The initial 
commission date for the plant was mid 2012 but at the time of writing the expected completion of 
the project was 2015 (Eskom, 2013:1, 2; Eskom, 2013b, 3). 
 
AES – Peaking Power 
In 2003, Eskom announced the need for urgent investment in peaking power. The necessary capacity 
was established at 2000MW and   Eskom, after preliminary research had decided that diesel powered 
Open Cycle Gas Turbine (OCGT) technology was the most appropriate solution (PARI, 2013:15).   It 
was planned that four units would be built to create the capacity and Eskom would build two plants 
allowing for IPP involvement in the remaining two (PARI, 2013:15).   Cabinet approved the process in 
December 2003 and in 2004 the DME sent out its call for assistance with the bidding process in terms 
of legal and technical assistance (PARI, 2013:15).  The IPP process was to be managed by the DME, 
however, the low level of skills within the department meant that Eskom was highly involved in the 
assessment of bids.  At the time, no regulations existed as to how the process would be carried out 
and the official guidelines on the process for IPP procurement were only released in 2011 (PARI, 
2013: 15). By 2005, five bidders had been shortlisted as pre-qualified bidders and in April 2006, the 
DME sent out an official request for proposals (RFP) (PARI, 2013: 15; DME, 2008).  Two bidders came 
through with detailed bid proposals in September 2007, the AES consortium and Suez –Inkanyezi 
(PARI, 2013: 15; Webb, 2007). AES was selected as the final bidder and entered into contract 
negotiations. The consortium asked for a   three month project extension to complete project 
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agreements in November 2007 that was granted by the DME. In March 2008, the deal collapsed  due 
to a failure to reconcile commitments made by  AES in the  RFP stage and the final contract terms 
declared be the DME with regards to issues of  pricing,  final timelines for generation to come on 
stream and commercial terms  (PARI,2013:15 ; DME, 2008). The key issues centred on who would 
bear the responsibility for fluctuating diesel prices. In May 2008 DME began negotiations with Suez-
Inkanyezi and these went through to the final licensing stage in 2011 and it is expected that 
construction will begin in 2013 (PARI, 2013:15).   
 
The challenges facing traditional energy IPP investment do not seem to haunt the renewable energy 
market and by 2013, South Africa had the highest growth in clean energy investment worldwide  
ahead of global giants such as  China, Japan and South Korea (Clark & England, 2014).  Initial plans for 
the development of green energy IPPs were based on tariff guarantees. A final decision was made to 
use a competitive bidding model that has led to impressive results with a decrease in prices at each 






























Appendix 3- Pricing 
  
South Africa faced a complex situation  with its pricing determination in that, whilst it was originally 
set to pursue a  Multi-Market Model, with  prices set through competitive market behaviour, the plan 
that was implemented was the single buyer model without a credible definition of how prices would 
be set. This lack of official regulation meant that Eskom was able to initially postpone the 
Mmamabula bid,   because of a lack of clarity on pricing regulations and that the deal with the first 
choice IPP for peaking power  collapsed over pricing issues.  
 
During  National Party rule, Eskom had made an arrangement with government to actively lower  the  
real price of electricity by 15% over the years 1994-2000. This system worked fairly well over its 
period of implementation as Eskom had moved away from investing in generation capacity to 
address the issues of under-electrification left by the apartheid government (Thopil & Pouris, 
2013:1). The pricing mechanism necessitated change after 2004 when Eskom was granted permission 
to invest in generation capacity.  
 
This change to pricing policy came through the implementation of the multi-year pricing 
determination (MYPD) carried out by  NERSA. The program was designed to  ensure, “Eskom’s cost 
recovery requirements, such that the utility remains functioning and sustains itself economically,” 
(Thopil & Pouris, 2013:1). The MYPD plan was developed for 2006/7  & 2008/9. In April 200, Eskom 
requested a revision of the plan based on, “variations in costs, revenues and initial erroneous 
estimates,” (Thopil & Pouris, 2013:1). This  revision was granted and led to an increase of 14.2%.  
 
In March 2008, Eskom again asked for a revision of the MYPD of that year based issues of fuel price 
volatility, fuel mix uncertainty,  energy demand uncertainty  and fuel  burn rate efficiency uncertainty 
(Thopil & Pouris, 2013:2). This revision requested a “35% per annum increase over the  second MYPD 
period,” from  2010 -2013. The revision request was brought before intensive public engagement and 
NERSA decided on 24.8% increase in 2010/11, a 25.8% increase over 2011/12 and a 25.9% increase 
over 2012/13 (Thopil & Pouris, 2013:2).  
 
The table below is a representation of the South African prices in c/kWh 
Average Price of Electricity in c/kWh       
         
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Redistributors 15.19 16.13 16.88 18.03 23.05 30.84 39.53 49.96 
Residential 38.70 40.08 41.74 44.12 52.86 63.98 66.45 79.52 
Commercial 21.88 22.69 23.50 24.61 31.29 40.97 52.63 51.21 
Industrial 13.97 14.75 16.01 17.11 21.46 27.03 34.34 42.13 
Mining 15.36 16.19 16.90 17.82 22.87 30.25 39.78 50.11 
Rural 30.83 32.86 33.69 35.54 45.29 58.96 72.72 89.22 
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